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The False Dichotomy Between  
Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks 
JAKE LINFORD 
Classifying a trademark as descriptive rather than suggestive 
fundamentally alters the scope of trademark protection. A descriptive 
mark, derived from a feature of the product or service sold, only 
qualifies for protection after the mark has acquired source significance, 
i.e., consumers see it as a trademark. A suggestive trademark, which 
indirectly invokes qualities of the product or service, is protected 
without evidence of source significance. Courts often struggle to 
distinguish between suggestive and descriptive marks. The effort would 
nevertheless be reasonable if the differences between suggestive and 
descriptive marks justified their disparate legal treatment. But in light 
of cognitive and historical research into language change, protecting a 
suggestive mark without evidence of source significance may not be 
warranted. 
 
In fact, trademark law erroneously inflates the difference between 
suggestive and descriptive marks. This mistake becomes apparent in 
light of theoretical, historical, and cognitive research into “semantic 
shift”: the process by which words gain and lose meaning over time. 
Linguistic analysis reveals an inconsistency between how trademark 
doctrine treats suggestive and descriptive trademarks and how 
consumers likely process them. Suggestive and descriptive marks are 
not so dissimilar as to justify different treatment. Instead, they likely 
influence consumers in similar ways. As a result, trademark law should 
reposition the line between descriptive and suggestive trademarks. A 
suggestive mark, like a descriptive mark, should be protected only upon 
a showing that the mark has developed source significance in the minds 
of consumers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In trademark law, much depends on the relationship between the word 
chosen as a trademark and the product sold under the mark.1 A firm might 
choose a mark derived from a quality or feature of the product sold—like 
SEALTIGHT for fasteners.2 The firm cannot acquire protection in this 
“descriptive” mark unless it can provide evidence that consumers see the word 
as a source signifier which tells them this product with this name comes from a 
single source.3 
A firm might instead choose a “suggestive” mark that indirectly invokes a 
quality or feature of the product sold—like GLEEM for toothpaste.4 The firm 
can acquire protection in the suggestive mark upon the first use of the mark in 
commerce, whether or not the firm has evidence that consumers see the word as 
a trademark.5 A suggestive mark is protected upon first use without evidence of 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” 
Trademarks, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110, 113 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, “Generic” 
Trademarks]. 
 2 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 3 A trademark is distinctive or source signifying and thus protectable if consumers are 
likely to perceive that it “identifies goods or services produced or sponsored by a particular 
person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1995). 
The person or firm may be unknown to the consumer. Suggestive marks are treated as 
inherently distinctive upon first use, id., but descriptive marks must show that the mark has 
become distinctive, or acquired “secondary meaning” in the eyes of consumers, id. § 13(b). 
Even if the firm proves its descriptive mark has acquired trademark meaning, courts still 
presume the mark is weak. See, e.g., John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 
966, 974 (11th Cir. 1983) (“A descriptive mark . . . is considered weak and is given a ‘narrow 
range of protection.’” (quoting 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 11:24, at 398 (1973))). 
 4 See B & B Hardware, 252 F.3d at 1012; Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with 
Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 771 (1990). 
 5 See, e.g., John H. Harland, 711 F.2d at 974 (“[A] suggestive mark can be protected 
without evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a). 
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source significance because such a mark is presumed to be “inherently 
distinctive,”6 i.e., innately capable of representing the source of a product.7 
The distinction between suggestive and descriptive can shape the outcome 
of trademark litigation,8 but distinguishing suggestive from descriptive marks is 
often difficult. Courts and scholars describe the suggestive–descriptive line as 
“nearly incapable of precise description”;9 “not always clear”;10 “shadowy”;11 
“murky”;12 “wholly lacking . . . in distinctiveness”;13 “difficult . . . to draw”;14 
“frequently difficult to apply”;15 uncertain and impossible to extrapolate from 
precedent;16 and “almost impossible to define in the abstract.”17 Frequently, 
classifying a mark as either suggestive or descriptive is a decision “made on an 
intuitive basis rather than as the result of a logical analysis susceptible of 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (stating 
that “because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, 
[suggestive marks] are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection” without 
evidence of source significance). Some courts also presume that a suggestive mark is strong. 
See, e.g., Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that the suggestive mark of the smaller junior user was inherently distinctive 
and thus deserved “broad protection”); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 
(4th Cir. 1984) (stating that suggestive marks are also considered “strong” as well as 
“presumptively valid” (quoting Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 
777, 780 (S.D.N.Y.1981))). But see Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 385 
(2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of any showing of secondary meaning, suggestive marks are 
at best moderately strong.”); John H. Harland, 711 F.2d at 974 (“[A]lthough a suggestive 
mark can be protected without evidence that it has acquired secondary meaning, [it] is 
comparatively weak.” (footnote omitted)). 
 7 Throughout the text, when I say product, I mean good(s) or service(s), but use product 
(singular) to simplify. 
 8 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d 
Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 56–79 and accompanying text. 
 9 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 
1033 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 
790 (5th Cir. 1983) (“These categories, like the tones in a spectrum, tend to blur at the edges 
and merge together. The labels are more advisory than definitional, more like guidelines than 
pigeonholes.”); infra notes 10–18 and accompanying text. 
 10 Surgicenters of Am., Inc. v. Med. Dental Surgeries, Co., 601 F.2d 1011, 1014 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
 11 Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1188 (1948). 
 12 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product 
Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 519 (1997) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Inherent 
Distinctiveness]. 
 13 Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 585, 
597 n.95 (2002). 
 14 Carter, supra note 4, at 771. 
 15 Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 16 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other 
grounds by Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 17 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 11:64 (4th ed. 2008).  
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articulation.”18 The inquiry would nevertheless be worth the trouble if it was 
clear that the differences between suggestive and descriptive marks justify the 
disparate results we see in the law. In other words, the suggestive–descriptive 
line is justifiable if consumers are in fact likely to perceive a suggestive mark as 
inherently source signifying. 
The creation of trademark meaning often involves adding a new sense to an 
existing word. Most word marks, including suggestive and descriptive marks, 
appropriate pre-existing words to bear source-signifying meaning.19 Trademark 
law denies protection to descriptive marks without evidence of source 
significance because the mark is derived from a feature of the product and thus 
is presumed unlikely to stand out as a trademark.20 On the other hand, trademark 
doctrine presumes that consumers see suggestive marks as inherently distinctive 
because there is a weak connection between the mark selected and the product 
sold.21 The law presumes this weak connection leaves consumers with no choice 
but to make an “imaginative leap” to connect the mark with the designated 
product.22 But there is evidence that the connection between a suggestive mark 
and the product sold are closer than the law recognizes. This Article marshals 
etymological,23 theoretical, and cognitive literatures on semantic shift—the way 
words add and lose meaning over time24—to argue that a suggestive mark is 
much more like a descriptive mark than the law currently recognizes. The 
suggestive–descriptive distinction is thus illusory at best. 
                                                                                                                     
 18 Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 19 See infra notes 42–55 and accompanying text. 
 20 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (July 2015) [hereinafter TMEP] (“Suggestive marks . . . when 
applied to the goods or services at issue, require imagination, thought, or perception to reach 
a conclusion as to the nature of those goods or services. . . . [A] descriptive 
term . . . immediately tells something about the goods or services.”). 
 21 Id. 
 22 See, e.g., Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding 
that BIHARI INTERIORS is suggestive rather than descriptive because consumers are 
required to make “an imaginative leap” to correctly identify plaintiff’s interior design 
services); see also, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106 
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding ROACH MOTEL for insect traps at least suggestive, if not arbitrary, 
because of the incongruity between the concept of a motel, where guests are welcomed, and 
what type of motel might be built for roaches, who are usually unwelcome guests); Stix 
Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“A 
term is suggestive if it requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as 
to the nature of goods. A term is descriptive if it forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the 
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”). 
 23 Etymology, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 
64893 [http://perma.cc/X8JZ-VE4V] (“The facts relating to the origin of a particular word 
or the historical development of its form and meaning; the origin of a particular word.”).  
 24 While this Article uses the term semantic shift, other scholars refer to these 
phenomena as semantic change, semantic progression, or semantic drift. See, e.g., 
ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT & RICHARD B. DASHER, REGULARITY IN SEMANTIC CHANGE 1 
(2002). 
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The semantic shift literature indicates that the law may systematically 
overestimate the ability of a suggestive mark to clearly communicate that it 
serves as a trademark while simultaneously underestimating the processing 
advantages provided to a firm that selects a suggestive mark. Semantic shift 
research explains how words with multiple related meanings confer processing 
advantages that make it easier for readers and listeners to slide from one 
meaning to another. Readers and listeners process words with multiple related 
meanings more quickly and more efficiently than words with multiple unrelated 
meanings, or with only a single meaning. Whether the relationship between two 
words is metonymic (where a feature of a thing is used as the name of the thing, 
like “Green Beret” for members of the U.S. Army Special Forces)25 or 
metaphoric (where one thing stands in for another with similar qualities, like 
“lip” for the edge of a cup),26 the relationship is “cognitively efficient,” helping 
the reader resolve ambiguity by channeling the reader’s cognitive processes 
from one connected meaning to another.27 Language change tends to follow this 
cognitively efficient route.28 The metaphoric connection between a suggestive 
mark and the product offered may thus benefit from similar processing 
advantages as the metonymic connection between a descriptive mark and its 
associated product.29 A suggestive mark is thus less likely to stand out as a 
source signifier than the law presumes. In light of these findings, this Article 
argues that the current line between suggestive and descriptive marks is 
incorrectly drawn. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part II describes the current approach 
to categorizing suggestive and descriptive marks, most famously summarized in 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.30 The Abercrombie spectrum 
is often criticized, but the standard critiques are unsatisfying. Those critiques 
fail to recognize how initial consumer perception of the connection between 
different meanings of a word shapes how trademark meaning is accessed, 
                                                                                                                     
 25 See, e.g., René Dirven, Metaphor As a Basic Means for Extending the Lexicon, in 
THE UBIQUITY OF METAPHOR: METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 85, 97 (Wolf 
Paprotté & René Dirven eds., 1985). 
 26 Ekaterini Klepousniotou, Reconciling Linguistics and Psycholinguistics: On the 
Psychological Reality of Linguistic Polysemy, in THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF POLYSEMY: NEW 
SOURCES OF EVIDENCE FOR THEORIES OF WORD MEANING 17, 27 (Marina Rakova et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter Klepousniotou, Reconciling].  
 27 See infra Part III.C. 
 28 See infra Part III.B. 
 29 A metonymic relationship is one where a feature of a thing is used for the name of 
the thing, like SEALTIGHT as a trademark for fasteners, based on a quality one would 
expect a fastener to have. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 
(8th Cir. 2001). Suggestive marks are instead metaphorically related to the good or service 
sold, like using GLEEM to sell toothpaste indirectly invokes the bright, shiny quality one 
could expect from thoroughly cleaned teeth. PaperCutter, Inc. v. Fay’s Drug Co., 900 F.2d 
558, 563 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Carter, supra note 4, at 771). These relationships are 
discussed more fully in Part IV, infra. 
 30 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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processed, and understood. To fill this gap, this Article looks to semantic shift 
research to understand how the connection between words cabins the 
communicative capacity of a mark and sets a baseline for the development of 
source significance. This Article is the first to apply semantic shift research to 
analyze how the perceived connection between descriptive, suggestive, and 
arbitrary marks and the products associated with those marks can shape 
consumer perception.31 Part III offers an abbreviated account of research into 
semantic shift and provides background for the subsequent critique of the false 
dichotomy between suggestive and descriptive trademarks. Part IV applies those 
linguistic accounts to provide a limited defense of the Abercrombie spectrum, 
and to critique the suggestive–descriptive line in trademark law. In many 
respects, the Abercrombie spectrum properly sorts trademarks to reflect 
processing advantages identified in the semantic shift literature. But the legal 
distinction between suggestive and descriptive marks ignores the similarities 
between metonymic and metaphoric polysemy. Both descriptive and suggestive 
marks have a polysemous relationship with the good or service sold. Both marks 
thus provide processing advantages that reduce cognitive workload compared 
to other categories of trademarks. In light of this insight, the stark divide 
between suggestive and descriptive trademarks is not justified. The inherent 
distinctiveness line in trademark law should be redrawn, and a suggestive mark 
                                                                                                                     
 31 See also generally Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1. Linguistics—the 
study of symbols and their meanings—has made limited inroads in the analysis of trademark 
law and policy, but in subfields other than semantic shift. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic 
Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) (applying a branch of 
linguistics, semiotics, or the study of signs, to trademark law and arguing that the “grammar 
[of trademark law] must be understood not simply in economic, but also in linguistic terms”); 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark Law, in TRADE MARKS AND 
BRANDS 140, 157 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that while trademark law should 
not become beholden to linguistics, linguistic principles are embedded in trademark law, and 
linguistic theory can provide a means for uncovering “the inevitably prescriptive content of 
supposedly descriptive assessments of trademark claims”); Alan Durant, ‘How Can I Tell 
the Trade Mark on a Piece of Gingerbread from All the Other Marks on It?’ Naming and 
Meaning in Verbal Trade Mark Signs, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS, supra, at 107, 132 
(suggesting that pragmatics and discourse analysis, the “branches of linguistics that 
investigate language in use,” are most likely to contribute to our understanding of the 
important issues in trademark law); Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand 
Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 77 (2014) (analyzing trademark dilution and genericness 
in light of psycholinguistics literature on semantic ambiguity resolution); Laura A. 
Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1320–21 (2010) 
(arguing that incorporating linguistic theory on language formation can help trademark law 
better reflect consumers’ perceptions of language); Thomas R. Lee et al., An Empirical and 
Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033, 1068–
69 (2009) (applying psychological and brand perception literature to challenge Beebe’s 
semiotic analysis); Regan Smith, Note, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for 
Scandalous and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007) (applying 
semiotic theory to argue for reforming the scandalous marks prohibition in trademark law). 
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should be protected only if the mark owner can provide evidence of source 
significance. 
II. THE CAPRICIOUS SUGGESTIVE–DESCRIPTIVE DICHOTOMY 
This Article presumes, without deciding, that the dominant economic 
justification provides a proper normative basis for trademark law.32 Under the 
economic rationale, the law protects a trademark as a unique source identifier 
so that consumers can more easily find a product from their preferred source.33 
Protecting a trademark from infringement reduces consumer search costs to the 
extent it prevents competitors from adopting a mark that would confuse 
consumers about the source of the competitor’s product. 
The economic justification also ostensibly provides the normative basis for 
the suggestive–descriptive line. Under the economic rationale, a trademark is 
protected because—and protectable to the extent that—the mark is “distinct 
from the product it brands and . . . [also] conveys information about that separate 
product.”34 Trademark law divides word marks into two groups35: those that are 
inherently distinctive (including suggestive marks), and those that are not 
(including descriptive marks).36 Suggestive marks are presumed inherently 
distinctive, protectable from first use in commerce, and often treated as 
inherently strong. On the other hand, descriptive marks are not protectable 
unless the mark owner can provide evidence of source significance or secondary 
meaning, and even then are presumed to be weaker than other trademarks. 
Trademark theory assumes that a descriptive term fails, on first use, to 
distinguish itself from the product it brands because of the relatively 
                                                                                                                     
 32 Trademark law embraces at least two categories of normative justifications that are 
somewhat in tension with one another: economic justifications that focus primarily on 
reducing consumer search costs; and moral justifications that include preventing injury to or 
misappropriation of mark owner goodwill and deception of consumers. For a description of 
the tension between these normative bases for trademark protection, see, for example, Robert 
G. Bone, Taking the Confusion Out of “Likelihood of Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible 
Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1307, 1311–12, 1335, 1350 
(2012) [hereinafter Bone, Taking]. 
 33 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search 
Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 778 (2004) (arguing that the historical 
normative goal of trademark law is to foster the flow of information in markets, thereby 
reducing search costs for consumers). But see Mark P. McKenna, The Normative 
Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (2007) (noting that 
while the dominant view is that “trademark law’s core policies [are] protecting consumers 
and improving the quality of information in the marketplace,” a historical examination of 
early trademark cases instead reveals that courts embraced a natural rights theory of 
trademark property, protecting mark owners from suffering diversion of consumers).  
 34 Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 187, 190 (2007).  
 35 This Article limits its analysis to word marks and does not consider the scope of 
protection for non-word trademarks like colors, images, or trade dress. 
 36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1995).  
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straightforward connection between the mark and the good sold. Furthermore, 
selecting a descriptive mark may provide the mark owner with a troubling 
advantage over competitors. The mark owner may use the descriptive mark to 
prevent competitors from effectively communicating with consumers, 
essentially “free riding” on the connection between the product and the mark. 
Thus a mark owner cannot secure protection in a descriptive mark unless there 
is evidence that the mark has acquired source significance in the eyes of 
consumers. 
On the other hand, because consumers must make what courts call “an 
imaginative leap” to connect the suggestive mark and the product sold,37 
trademark doctrine presumes a suggestive mark is inherently distinctive. The 
law assumes that the metaphoric connection between a suggestive mark and the 
product offered is too attenuated to confer processing power. Thus, the law 
presumes a suggestive mark is likely to stand out to consumers as a trademark, 
and that consumers will treat it as such. 
The line between the two categories is difficult to draw, but some courts and 
commentators simplify the inquiry to questions of competitive necessity and the 
potential harm of language depletion. As this Part explains, those issues cannot 
be understood without recognizing what and how the mark communicates with 
consumers, and how consumers process the information that the mark attempts 
to convey. 
A. Trademark Protection Along the Abercrombie Spectrum 
Trademark law protects the exclusive use of a word only to the extent that 
the word signifies a singular source for a product. The rules for how easily a 
word can acquire protection as a trademark are based in large part on the 
relationship between the word chosen as a trademark and the product sold under 
that mark.38 In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., Judge Friendly 
articulated a widely adopted spectrum that described the capability of a given 
mark to acquire source significance, and thus trademark protection.39 As the 
court stated in Abercrombie, the more inherently distinctive a mark, the more 
readily it can bear source significance, and the easier it is for the hopeful mark 
owner to acquire protection.40 The following table summarizes the current state 
of the law. 
                                                                                                                     
 37 See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 317–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 38 Potomac Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Takoma Acad. Alumni 
Ass’n, Inc., Civ. Action No. DKC 13-1128, 2014 WL 857947, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 4, 2014) 
(“Whether an unregistered mark is protected under federal law depends upon its 
classification—either as ‘generic,’ ‘descriptive,’ ‘suggestive,’ or ‘arbitrary/fanciful.’” (citing 
U.S. Search, LLC v. U.S. Search.com, Inc., 300 F.3d 517, 523 (4th Cir. 2002))). 
 39 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 40 Id.  
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Table 1: Presumed Protectability and Strength Based on Position Along 
Abercrombie Spectrum 
Abercrombie Category 
(relationship between mark 
and product) 
Protectability Inherent Strength 
Fanciful mark: 
Coined for use as a 
trademark, not derived from a 
pre-existing word 
Ex.: XEROX for photocopiers 
Inherently 
protectable on first 
use 
Presumed strong Arbitrary mark: 
Derived from a pre-existing 
word that has no connection 
with the product 
Ex.: APPLE for computers 
Suggestive mark: 
Pre-existing word with some 
connection to the product, via 
an imaginative leap 
Ex.: SKINVISIBLE for 
transparent adhesive 
bandages; GLEEM for 
toothpaste 
Varies—some courts 
presume suggestive 
marks are weaker 
than arbitrary / 
fanciful marks 
Descriptive mark: 
Pre-existing term with a clear 
connection to the product 
sold, via a direct description 
of a product feature 
Ex.: SEALTIGHT for 
fasteners 
Protectable only 
with evidence of 
source significance 
Presumed weak 
Ex ante generic mark: 
Word whose meaning has 
shifted from a class of 
products, to one particular 
brand 
Ex.: HOG for Harley 
Davidson motorcycles denied 
protection, despite evidence 
of source significance, on 
grounds of trademark 
incapacity 
Unprotectable, 
even with evidence 
of source 
significance 
Not considered 
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Marks that are inherently distinctive qualify for protection without proof of 
source significance or secondary meaning.41 As described along the 
Abercrombie spectrum, the strongest marks have no inherent relationship to the 
product sold. A fanciful mark is a made-up word, like XEROX for photocopiers. 
An arbitrary mark is derived from a pre-existing but unrelated word, like APPLE 
for computers. Both fanciful and arbitrary marks are considered strong and 
protected from the first use in commerce.42 
Like arbitrary and fanciful marks, suggestive marks are treated as 
presumptively valid, and thus protectable without evidence of secondary 
meaning.43 The first use of an inherently distinctive mark is treated as source 
signifying on the theory that consumers who see a word that doesn’t describe 
the product will presume the word was meant to serve as a trademark and treat 
it like one.44 As articulated in Abercrombie, a suggestive mark is treated as 
inherently distinctive because it hints at the quality or characteristic of the good 
without actually describing it.45 A suggestive mark does not directly identify a 
feature of the product in question, but the suggestive mark “requires the 
consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as to the nature of 
the[] goods [offered].”46 
Unlike the aforementioned marks, descriptive terms more directly refer to a 
quality or characteristic of the product with which the mark is associated.47 For 
example, a term like SEALTIGHT for fasteners describes qualities that a 
fastener would likely have, and the claimed mark is treated as directly related to 
the product designated. Due in part to an underlying suspicion that control of 
descriptive terms would make it more costly for competitors to enter the 
                                                                                                                     
 41 See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 42 See also infra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 43 Some courts treat suggestive marks as inherently distinctive but also weaker than 
arbitrary or fanciful marks. Compare M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 
1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that suggestive marks, like descriptive marks, are “conceptually 
weak”), with Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527 (stating that suggestive marks are also 
considered “strong” as well as “presumptively valid” (quoting Del Labs., Inc. v. Alleghany 
Pharmacal Corp., 516 F. Supp. 777, 780 (S.D.N.Y.1981))). 
 44 Bone, Taking, supra note 32, at 1313 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 
529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000)). 
 45 Suggestive marks were also a late addition to trademark law. See Abercrombie, 537 
F.2d at 10 (“The category of ‘suggestive’ marks was spawned by the felt need to accord 
protection to marks that were neither exactly descriptive on the one hand nor truly fanciful 
on the other . . . .”). 
 46 Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1528); see also TMEP, supra note 20, § 1209.01(a) (“Suggestive 
marks . . . when applied to the goods or services at issue, require imagination, thought, or 
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of those goods or services. . . . [A] 
descriptive term . . . immediately tells something about the goods or services.”). 
 47 Thomas McCarthy has described the difference between descriptive and suggestive 
marks as “no more objective and free of personal predilections than a test which asks persons 
to divide all color shades into ‘light’ and ‘dark.’” MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 11:71. 
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market,48 a descriptive term is not considered inherently distinctive, and will not 
be protected unless the mark owner establishes that the term has acquired source 
significance or secondary meaning.49 
A descriptive mark acquires source significance when it becomes 
sufficiently distinctive to establish “a mental association in buyers’ minds 
between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.”50 Without proof 
of source significance, a descriptive trademark does not merit protection, and a 
court will not inquire whether an alleged infringer’s use of a similar mark on 
similar products is likely to confuse consumers.51 To determine whether a mark 
has acquired source significance, courts and examiners look for evidence that 
the mark has come to represent the source of the product.52 While it can be 
difficult to establish source significance, it is not impossible. For example, 
COCA-COLA has been frequently cited as the “paradigm of a descriptive mark 
that has acquired a secondary meaning.”53 
Finally, a generic term is not protectable, even if it acquires secondary 
meaning.54 Courts and scholars presume that any word that has once served as 
the name of a product may not function as a source signifying mark for that 
category of product. Under this doctrine of trademark incapacity, also known as 
the doctrine of de facto secondary meaning, trademark protection is denied even 
                                                                                                                     
 48 Stephanie M. Greene, Sorting Out “Fair Use” and “Likelihood of Confusion” in 
Trademark Law, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 43, 70–72 (2006) (arguing that allowing a monopoly of a 
descriptive term creates a barrier to entry because a potential competitor cannot use the 
descriptive term and therefore must expend more effort to communicate with and attract 
consumers). 
 49 See, e.g., Larsen v. Terk Techs. Corp., 151 F.3d 140, 148 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 50 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 15:5; see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 
81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “secondary meaning” exists when, “in the 
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the 
source of the product rather than the product itself” (quoting Dayton Progress Corp. v. Lane 
Punch Corp., 917 F.2d 836, 839 (4th Cir. 1990))); Wolf Appliance, Inc. v. Viking Range 
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (“Secondary meaning arises when a mark 
‘has been used so long and so exclusively by one company in association with its goods or 
services that the word or phrase has come to mean that those goods or services are the 
company’s trademark.’” (quoting Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 641 (7th 
Cir. 2001))). 
 51 See, e.g., Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 52 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). Relevant evidence of 
secondary meaning will include complaints by actual customers; surveys by relevant 
potential consumers; advertising expenditures; sales volume; and length of use. See Jake 
Linford, Trademark Owner As Adverse Possessor: Productive Use and Property 
Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703, 728 (2013) [hereinafter Linford, Adverse 
Possessor]. One can ask consumers about cola, and they will inevitably recognize Coca-Cola 
as a distinctive brand, or one can look to sales and advertising, and Coca-Cola’s duration in 
the marketplace as proxies for consumer perception. 
 53 Larsen, 151 F.3d at 148 n.7.  
 54 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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when a mark owner presents otherwise overwhelming evidence that consumers 
see the term predominantly as a trademark.55 
The inquiry into protectability is context sensitive. A word or phrase can be 
generic for one line of products, descriptive for a second, suggestive for a third, 
and arbitrary for a fourth. For example, as one court noted, “HONEY BROWN 
is generic in the context of ale beers, possibly descriptive in the context of lager 
beers, or wood stains, and probably suggestive or arbitrary in the context of 
grilling products, internet service providers, musical instruments, or paper 
products.”56 
B. The High Stakes of the Suggestive–Descriptive Line 
Significant consequences turn on the suggestive–descriptive determination. 
Owners whose marks are designated as descriptive face hurdles acquiring a use-
based registration and an uphill battle enforcing their marks against alleged 
infringers. Suggestive marks, however, qualify for registration without evidence 
of secondary meaning and are often presumed not only inherently distinctive 
but inherently strong. As this Section highlights, the consequences are drastic 
for an inquiry that turns on such exceedingly fine distinctions. 
Failing to present evidence of secondary meaning is of no consequence for 
a suggestive mark, but results in loss or denial of protection for a descriptive 
mark. For example, in American Express Marketing & Development Corp. v. 
Black Card LLC, American Express challenged Black Card LLC’s registration 
of BLACKCARD for credit and debit card services on descriptiveness 
grounds.57 The court was persuaded that BLACKCARD was descriptive of a 
premium grade of credit card.58 Thus, when Black Card LLC presented no 
evidence of secondary meaning, the court ordered the cancellation of Black 
Card LLC’s registration.59 
Other trademark doctrines also turn in large part on the suggestive–
descriptive divide. For example, some mark owners claim a family of marks, 
like McDonald’s Corporation’s MC- family of marks for restaurant food items.60 
Scholars have argued that descriptive terms cannot constitute the common 
                                                                                                                     
 55 But see generally Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1 (applying theories 
of semantic shift to argue that generic terms should be allowed to obtain trademark protection 
when there is sufficient evidence that consumers primarily perceive the term as a trademark). 
 56 Real News Project, Inc. v. Indep. World Television, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1299, 
1306 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 57 Am. Express Mktg. & Dev. Corp. v. Black Card LLC, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 
1927 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The USPTO’s electronic search system reports that the 
BLACKCARD mark was assigned to American Express. BLACKCARD, Registration No. 
78717042. 
 58 Am. Express, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1933.  
 59 Id. at 1934.  
 60 See, e.g., J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1463 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (holding that a formative like “Mc” need not operate as a trademark in order for 
protection to extend to a family of marks). 
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element of a family of marks.61 Other authorities have instead held that a 
descriptive term can serve as the common element only when there is a strong 
showing of secondary meaning.62 For instance, in Spraying Systems Co. v. 
Delavan, Inc., plaintiff Spraying Systems sold a series of spray nozzle products 
under a family of -JET marks, like TEEJET, AIRJET, and FOAMJET.63 The 
court in Spraying Systems concluded the -JET suffix was descriptive, rather than 
inherently distinctive, and rejected the plaintiff’s claims due to failure to 
establish secondary meaning.64 Spraying Systems protested that in J & J Snack 
Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., McDonald’s Corp. had successfully 
defended its MC- family of marks without evidence of secondary meaning.65 
The court in Spraying Systems distinguished J & J Snack Foods on the ground 
that MC- was “inherently distinctive,” unlike -JET, and evidence of secondary 
meaning was therefore not required.66 
Other mark owners receive outsized benefit from a suggestiveness 
determination. For example, in Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., the 
court considered whether the mark 5-HOUR ENERGY for an “energy shot” was 
descriptive or suggestive.67 Living Essentials, the mark owner’s predecessor in 
interest, began marketing 5-HOUR ENERGY in 2005, shortly after the PTO 
rejected its trademark application on descriptiveness grounds.68 In March 2006, 
N.V.E. entered the energy shot market with 6 HOUR POWER.69 The district 
court granted N.V.E.’s motion for summary judgment on Living Essential’s 
claim of trademark infringement,70 finding no likelihood of confusion between 
the products. As part of its analysis, the district court concluded 5-HOUR 
ENERGY was a weak, descriptive mark,71 which was, from the court’s 
perspective, “[p]ivotal” in its determination that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact regarding likelihood of confusion.72 
On appeal, N.V.E. argued that Living Essentials failed to establish 
secondary meaning in the 5-HOUR ENERGY mark prior to N.V.E’s first use of 
                                                                                                                     
 61 See, e.g., David J. Kera, Tips from the TTAB: Family of Marks, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 
419, 420 (1977). Some authorities have articulated a similar rule. See, e.g., Cambridge Filter 
Corp. v. Servodyne Corp., 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 99, 103 (T.T.A.B. 1975). 
 62 See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Salsbury Labs., 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 250, 255 
(T.T.A.B. 1970). 
 63 Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 64 Id. at 396.  
 65 J & J Snack Foods, 932 F.2d at 1463. 
 66 Spraying Sys., 975 F.2d at 395. 
 67 Innovation Ventures, LLC v. N.V.E., Inc., 694 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 728. 
 71 Id. at 729 (“[G]iven the descriptive nature of Plaintiff’s mark, i.e., that it provides 
users with five hours of energy, the mark itself has little strength.” (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting the district court opinion, 747 F. Supp. 2d 853, 868 (E.D. Mich. 2010))). 
 72 Id. at 731 (quoting 747 F. Supp. 2d at 871). 
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the 6 HOUR POWER mark.73 If 5-HOUR ENERGY were descriptive, and if 
Living Essentials could not establish secondary meaning, it could not prevail in 
a claim that N.V.E.’s use of 6 HOUR POWER was likely to confuse 
consumers.74 Instead, the court of appeals applied de novo review and 
concluded that 5-HOUR ENERGY was suggestive. In reaching that conclusion, 
the court noted that 5-HOUR ENERGY was suggestive because both the method 
of energy transference and the type of energy transferred were potentially 
ambiguous.75 Reasonable minds might disagree with the court’s determination, 
but even if the court was straining to find that consumers must use “imagination 
and perception to determine the nature of the goods,”76 the holding left Living 
Essentials well-placed to proceed against N.V.E. 
Likewise, in Menashe v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., a publicist and a fashion 
model sought a declaratory judgment that their use of SEXY LITTLE THING 
and SEXY LITTLE THINGS as a mark for lingerie was non-infringing.77 
Victoria’s Secret had used SEXY LITTLE THINGS as a mark for lingerie prior 
to the declaratory plaintiffs’ attempt to secure their own intent-to-use 
application.78 But the plaintiffs claimed that SEXY LITTLE THINGS was 
descriptive for lingerie and that Victoria’s Secret had not acquired secondary 
meaning prior to plaintiffs’ first use.79 The court instead concluded that because 
SEXY LITTLE THINGS was suggestive of Victoria’s Secret’s lingerie line, it 
could establish priority without an inquiry into secondary meaning.80 Given the 
short window between the parties’ entrance into the market, evidence of 
secondary meaning might have been difficult to establish. Victoria’s Secret’s 
priority win thus turned on the distinctiveness determination. 
Courts have also noted, in disputes over whether alleged infringement will 
confuse consumers, that if a mark is suggestive “there is a stronger likelihood 
that a jury could reasonably conclude that the ‘strength of the mark’ factor” in 
the test for likelihood of confusion favors the mark owner.81 For example, in 
Wallach v. Longevity Network,82 the court gave little weight to survey evidence 
that a petitioner’s mark had not acquired secondary meaning,83 concluding that 
                                                                                                                     
 73 Innovation Ventures, 694 F.3d at 728–29. 
 74 Id. at 729 (citing Burke–Parsons–Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 
871 F.2d 590, 595–96 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
 75 Id. at 730 (proposing that energy transference might occur through injections, pills, 
or exercise, and the energy transferred could be electrical or nuclear). 
 76 Id. (quoting Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358, 362 (6th 
Cir. 1984)).  
 77 Menashe v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 78 Id. at 417. 
 79 Id. at 422. 
 80 Id. at 425. 
 81 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 
1034 (9th Cir. 2010); see also supra note 43. 
 82 Wallach v. Longevity Network, Ltd., No. CV 04-2404 SJO (RZx), 2005 WL 
5958091, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2005). 
 83 Id. at *13. 
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petitioner’s mark LONGEVITY for nutritional supplements was both 
incontestable and suggestive. The mark’s incontestable status insulated it from 
a challenge based on descriptiveness, although the reach of the mark could still 
be limited if it were deemed weak.84 But the court concluded the suggestiveness 
of the mark itself was evidence that the mark was not weak.85 
Any observer of trademark law can find cases where they believe a court 
made a poor choice in policing the suggestive–descriptive line. The cases above 
highlight some recent close calls, and the dramatic difference that hinges on 
where the contested mark falls on the Abercrombie spectrum. The next Section 
considers the difficulty in drawing the suggestive–descriptive line, and the tests 
courts have applied in the attempt. 
C. How Courts Distinguish Suggestive from Descriptive Trademarks 
Distinguishing distinctive from descriptive marks is a difficult endeavor 
with high stakes. Drawing the distinctiveness line comes down to a mix of two 
factors. Courts inquire whether protection of the mark might cause language 
depletion or otherwise harm competitors. They also ask how and what the mark 
communicates to consumers. The following table summarizes the current state 
of the law. 
                                                                                                                     
 84 Id. at *14; see also Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 52, at 754 (describing a 
split between the Courts of Appeals on whether an incontestable mark is entitled to a 
presumption of strength). 
 85 Wallach, 2005 WL 5958091, at *12. 
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1. Line Drawing Based on Language Depletion and Suitable 
Replacement Marks 
For many courts, policing the line between descriptive and suggestive marks 
requires a judgment call about competitors’ need to use the mark.86 
Appropriating a generic term may reduce the ability of competing firms to enter 
the market or sell their product, because they cannot use terms they would prefer 
to use to communicate with consumers.87 The same rationale animates 
resistance to protection for descriptive marks. Courts assume that protecting a 
descriptive term as a trademark may create a monopoly over a word that 
competitors need to use.88 Courts express concern over the lack of suitable 
substitutes. For example, in Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that “[i]f the trademark holder were allowed exclusive rights” in 
descriptive terms, “the language would be depleted in much the same way as if 
generic words were protectable.”89 
                                                                                                                     
 86 J. Janewa OseiTutu, A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: The Cultural 
Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 147, 179 (2011). 
 87 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 292–93 (1987). 
 88 Perfect Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (noting that “the Second Circuit has also considered whether a finding that a mark is 
inherently distinctive will make it difficult for manufacturers of similar products to market 
their goods” (citing Abercrombie Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d. Cir. 
1976))).  
 89 Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting New 
Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
Table 2: Standard Articulation of Differences Between Descriptive, 
Suggestive, and Arbitrary Trademarks 
Descriptive Direct Few Significant Immediate connection 
High bar—
proof of 
secondary 
meaning 
required 
Suggestive Indirect More / Many Insignificant 
Indirect 
connection; 
imaginative 
leap required 
Low bar—
inherently 
distinctive on 
first use 
Arbitrary No connection Any word None 
Incongruous; 
no advantage 
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While courts express concern over language depletion, a certain level of 
“language exclusivity” reduces consumer search costs.90 If the law secures the 
ability of trademark owners to engage in relatively exclusive use of their 
respective marks to identify their individual products, consumers can more 
readily find the product they prefer to buy. Lower search costs can lead to more 
competitive markets, because consumers can more easily find replacement 
goods.91 Protection of a nondistinctive mark would not, however, lower search 
costs, but would impose costs on competitors to the extent the non-distinctive 
mark “uses words, symbols, shapes, or colors that are common to those used by 
other producers” of a particular product.92 
Some scholars see the danger of language depletion as directly related to the 
perceived inherent strength of the different Abercrombie categories. For 
example, Stephen Carter raises concerns that the farther along the Abercrombie 
spectrum a mark is from a fanciful term, i.e., a made up word, the greater the 
risk of language depletion.93 Some commentators thus assume that concerns 
over language depletion will consistently arise with regard to descriptive marks, 
but rarely if ever for arbitrary marks. For instance, William Landes and Richard 
Posner assert that protection of descriptive terms may reduce welfare because 
“[a] given product has only so many attributes that interest buyers.”94 On the 
other hand, for arbitrary marks, the “450,000 words in Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary . . . are freely substitutable if one is uninterested in 
meaning.”95 
Commentators disagree about whether protecting a suggestive mark 
threatens language depletion or competitive harm, and these competing 
assertions have little empirical support. For example, Landes and Posner 
conclude that the number of available suggestive marks is “not much less” than 
arbitrary or fanciful marks, noting that goods with suggestive marks like 
BUSINESS WEEK and WALL STREET JOURNAL compete effectively with 
goods with arbitrary marks like FORBES and BARRON’S.96 The ability of 
marks to compete doesn’t speak to whether other competitors were blocked off 
                                                                                                                     
 90 “Language exclusivity” is a term used by Stephen Carter. Carter, supra note 4, at 
769. Landes and Posner instead call it “language monopoly.” Landes & Posner, supra note 
87, at 292. 
 91 See, e.g., Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 92 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 288. 
 93 Carter, supra note 4, at 775 (“[T]he elasticity of supply of low-cost substitute marks 
varies as a function of the distance of the mark from the generic.”). 
 94 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 290. Landes and Posner observe, however, that 
if a descriptive term becomes a source signifier, granting protection “may create consumer 
benefits, by reducing confusion and search costs by more than the costs to rivals of being 
forbidden to use the same word.” Id. Lisa Ramsey argues instead that this shift occurs 
precisely because the law protects rights in descriptive terms, and the shift would be unlikely 
to occur without the legal right. Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First 
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1157–58 n.319 (2003). 
 95 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 289. 
 96 Id. 
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because they couldn’t use a suggestive mark like WALL STREET JOURNAL 
to sell their newspapers. Other scholars voice suspicion that there may be a 
limited supply of suitable suggestive marks, or that commandeering a suggestive 
mark might create the same competitive advantage one acquires from 
controlling a descriptive mark. For example, Stephen Carter hypothesizes that 
the problem of language depletion may manifest just as strongly for suggestive 
marks as descriptive marks.97 Similarly, Terry Fisher notes that protection of 
any mark can harm later entrants whether the protected name is informative or 
attractive.98 
The threat of language depletion is not universally accepted.99 
Commentators have noted that the preference of many competitors is to select a 
distinctive and distinguishable mark that is unlike a prior competitor’s mark.100 
Scholars have also noted that there are a limited number of firms that can 
effectively compete in a given market, reducing the number of alternative 
trademarks that must be available in order to support a properly functioning 
market.101 
A more complete picture of the line between suggestive and descriptive 
marks requires more than an analysis of competition concerns.102 In fact, 
correctly calculating the danger of language depletion depends on the cost to 
rivals of developing alternative means to denote the product sold.103 In addition, 
                                                                                                                     
 97 Carter, supra note 4, at 793–94; cf. id. at 774. (“[T]he possibility of rent-seeking 
through a costly language exclusivity is not limited to the case of a firm’s adoption of a 
generic word, and the other cases in which rent-seeking might occur are somewhat more 
difficult to deal with. The unhappy truth is that firms try consistently (often against their 
attorneys’ advice) to find marks that, while perhaps not generic, are a long way from being 
fanciful.”).  
 98 William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 170 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) (“[T]rademarks 
can sometimes be socially harmful—for example, by enabling the first entrant into a market 
to discourage competition by appropriating for itself an especially attractive or informative 
brand name.”). 
 99 See, e.g., Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 
702–03 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981) (noting that available words are abundant and “possible 
varieties of advertising display and packaging are virtually endless”). 
 100 See, e.g., Jerre B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 90 TRADEMARK 
REP. 823, 828 n.32 (2000). 
 101 Carter, supra note 4, at 788 (“[O]nly a limited number of marks will be removed 
from the market language in any given product market, because there is not space for an 
infinite number of firms.”). 
 102 McCarthy has suggested a laundry list of questions a court might ask to distinguish 
suggestive from descriptive marks. MCCARTHY, supra note 17, §§ 11:21–:22, :66–:71 (cited 
by Trustco Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Glens Falls Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 903 F. Supp. 335, 342 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995)) (proposing courts consider 1) how much imagination is required to 
connect the term to the product; 2) whether the mark says something about the product that 
competitors would want to say about their similar competing products; 3) whether other 
sellers use the term; 4) whether the mark conjures up a purely arbitrary connection; and 5) 
whether buyers are likely to see the mark as a symbol of origin, or self-laudatory advertising). 
 103 Landes & Posner, supra note 87, at 292. 
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questions of competitive harm turn on how a trademark communicates 
information to consumers, and how efficiently the mark can make connections 
between the source and the product offered for sale. It is not enough to ask how 
many substitutes are left when a mark owner selects a mark. The law must also 
consider which substitutes work as source signifiers or product identifiers and 
why. The next Section summarizes how courts and commentators describe the 
communicative effect of various trademarks along the Abercrombie spectrum. 
2. Communicative Power and the Imaginary Line Between Descriptive 
and Suggestive Marks 
The federal courts of appeals have articulated several related but distinct 
tests for distinguishing suggestive from descriptive marks. The majority of 
circuits ask about the degree of imagination required to connect the trademark 
to the product.104 As the Seventh Circuit states, “if the mark imparts information 
directly, it is descriptive,” but “[i]f it stands for an idea which requires some 
operation of the imagination to connect it with the goods, it is suggestive.”105 
Applying a similar standard in Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Industries, 
Inc.,106 the Second Circuit concluded that FORTIFLEX for plastic resin was 
suggestive despite its descriptive element because it “[o]bviously . . . takes 
imagination to conjure the image of plastic resin from the term 
‘FORTIFLEX.’”107 In other cases, the inquiry turns on the directness or immediacy 
of the connection between the product and the trademark.108 For instance, in In 
                                                                                                                     
 104 See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 952 (7th Cir. 
1992); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other 
grounds by Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Some scholars criticize this imagination standard. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 31, at 1044 
(“‘[I]magination’ and related inquiries introduce a theoretical sleight of hand: They begin 
with the premise that trademark protectability turns on consumer perception of inherent 
distinctiveness, but then formulate tests that instead evaluate the immediacy or degree of 
inherent descriptiveness.”). 
 105 See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(quoting ARTHUR H. SEIDEL, TRADEMARK LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.06, at 77 (1963)). 
 106 Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 107 Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Soltex 
Polymer, 832 F.2d at 1328); see also Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. v. United Hardware Distrib. 
Co., 253 F.2d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 1958), cited with approval by Union Carbide, 531 F.2d at 
379 (“Suggestive terms ‘suggest’, but do not describe the qualities of a particular product. 
The distinction threatens to be one without a difference. Essentially, however, the common 
and ordinary meaning of the term to the public and the incongruous use of it as it relates to 
the product determine whether a term is suggestive.” (quoting the district court opinion, 
Union Carbide, 392 F. Supp. 280, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1975))). 
 108 Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 
902, 911 (9th Cir. 1995) (defining the inquiry into imaginativeness as one concerning “how 
immediate and direct is the thought process from the mark to the particular product. If the 
mental leap between the word and the product’s attribute is not almost instantaneous, this 
strongly indicates suggestiveness, not direct descriptiveness.” (citation omitted) (first 
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re American Society of Clinical Pathologists, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals held that REGISTRY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGISTS was merely 
descriptive because it would “immediately convey to one seeing or hearing it 
the thought of appellant’s [board certification and examination services].”109 
This inquiry into the imagination required of consumers versus directness 
of connection between the product and the mark has been subdivided into tests 
about whether the mark describes “the ingredients, qualities, or characteristics 
of the goods”;110 “conveys information regarding a function, or purpose, or use 
of the goods”;111 describes “a feature or part of the goods”;112 or “conveys 
information about any properties of the goods.”113 For many courts, the 
perception of communicative effectiveness turns on the immediacy of the 
connection between mark and product. 
The suggestive–descriptive line also ostensibly turns on consumer 
perspective.114 A descriptive term “conveys to one who is unfamiliar with the 
product its functions or qualities.”115 Unfortunately, because evidence of 
secondary meaning is required only for descriptive marks, a court often 
                                                                                                                     
quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 349; and then quoting MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11.21[1], 
at 11-108 to -109)); In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (“[A 
descriptive mark] forthwith conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or 
characteristics of the goods.” (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc., 537 
F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976))); Perfect Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 
519, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The defining feature of a descriptive mark is that it gives the 
consumer an immediate idea of the contents of the product.”). 
 109 In re Am. Soc’y of Clinical Pathologists, Inc., 442 F.2d 1404, 1407 (C.C.P.A. 1971). 
 110 See, e.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 528 (1924) (“A 
name which is merely descriptive of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of an article 
of trade cannot be appropriated as a trademark . . . .”); Andrew J. McPartland, Inc. v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 164 F.2d 603, 608 (C.C.P.A. 1947) (“[T]he law w[ill] not secure 
to any person the exclusive use of a trade-mark consisting merely of words descriptive of the 
qualities, ingredients, or characteristics of an article of trade . . . .” (quoting Estate of P.D. 
Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920))). 
 111 In re Abcor, 588 F.2d at 813; see also, e.g., In re Reynolds Metals Co., 480 F.2d 902, 
903–04 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (stating that although “merely descriptive” marks are unregistrable, 
marks “suggestive of one purpose to which the goods may be put . . . are registrable”).  
 112 See, e.g., Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 733 (3d 
Cir. 1957) (“Here we have an effort to register an alleged trade-mark, consisting of 
something which is a mechanically functional feature of an automobile tire, and not 
registerable at all, and is descriptive of the particular type of tire . . . .” (quoting Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, 25 F.3d 833, 844 (4th Cir. 1928))).  
 113 See, e.g., JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2.03, at 2-31 
(1988) (“[A term] is descriptive if it informs the purchasing public of the characteristics, 
quality, functions, uses, ingredients, components, or other properties of a product, or conveys 
comparable information about a service.”). 
 114 Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The [Lanham] 
Act is aimed to protect purchasers in the marketplace, and it is their perception that 
determines whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive.” (citing Thompson Medical Co. v. 
Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985))). 
 115 In re D.C. Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1044 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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evaluates likely consumer perception without key evidence of how consumers 
see the mark,116 relying instead on how it thinks consumers will perceive the 
mark.117 
Due to the close conceptual relationship between a descriptive mark and the 
product with which it is associated, some scholars argue that selecting a 
descriptive term as a mark allows the mark owner to “free ride” on associations 
between the mark and the product sold.118 On the other hand, suggestive marks 
are treated as though they do not pose any danger of free riding because the 
connection between mark and product is insufficiently direct.119 In fact, courts 
sometimes conclude that if the mark is suggestive, it is the second entrant that 
engages in problematic free riding which the law should discourage.120 
Courts err in substituting the directness of the connection between the mark 
and the product for the effectiveness of the mark as a communicator. To the 
contrary, recent research indicates that some arbitrary or fanciful marks can be 
equally effective vessels for a number of different products. For example, when 
professional product namers like Catchword or Interbrand generate a list of 
names for a client, the client eventually chooses one, but many of the remaining 
names are catalogued and reused when the next client needs a name. These 
professional namers operate as if there exists a “Platonic ideal of good names, 
independent of products good or bad—a name so good that it could work, if not 
on anything, than at least on many things.”121 This is so in part because recent 
studies suggest morphemes and phonemes, the building blocks of words, convey 
meaning even before those building blocks are combined into a word.122 
                                                                                                                     
 116 Cf. supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the 5-HOUR ENERGY case). 
 117 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 301 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 118 See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 94, at 1155 (“[W]hen a descriptive term is first used as 
a mark, that mark is not yet distinctive, but it is valuable instantly—before any advertising 
or sales—because the term is attribute-identifying and provides information about the 
qualities and characteristics of the product. A business that selects and uses a descriptive 
term as a mark on its product is, in effect, free-riding off the attribute-identifying value of 
the descriptive term.” (footnote omitted)); see also Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 
772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 119 See, e.g., A.J. Canfield, 808 F.2d at 297 (stating that suggestive marks convey indirect 
or vague information about the product or service). 
 120 See, e.g., Scandia Down, 772 F.3d at 1430. 
 121 Neal Gabler, The Weird Science of Naming New Products, N.Y. TIMES MAG.  
(Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/magazine/the-weird-science-of-
naming-new-products.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4KJZ-BCRD] (reporting on interviews 
with professional namers at Catchword and Interbrand). 
 122 Multiple studies conducted by linguist Will Leben report that survey participants 
perceive some made-up words as fast, small, and light versus slow, big, and heavy depending 
on the vowels and consonants comprising the word and the order in which they are used. Id. 
For example, research participants report that “fip” sounds faster than “fop” because the 
word “fip” has less acoustic substance or weight than fop. Likewise, the “S” of Swiffer, a 
mark for mops with a disposable head, sounds fast and easy, while the “D” of Dasani, a mark 
for bottled water sounds heavier, and thus relaxing rather than refreshing. Id. See generally 
Jake Linford, Are Trademarks Ever Fanciful? (Dec. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
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In analyzing trademark law, courts should consider how consumers process 
the information communicated by the trademark. The Abercrombie spectrum 
posits that the connection between the word chosen and the product offered 
channels trademark meaning. We can gain insight into whether that is so by 
examining how language changes, how change is processed and how new 
meanings are added to the lexicon. An understanding of these phenomena can 
help us evaluate how consumers are likely to react when a firm tries to add new 
source signifying meaning to an existing word. This information may then lead 
us to reconsider the treatment of various categories of trademarks along the 
Abercrombie spectrum. 
This Article is not the first to question the Abercrombie spectrum, or 
whether courts should apply it. Standard critiques of the Abercrombie spectrum 
as it applies to word marks follow two primary lines of attack.123 Some scholars 
argue that the spectrum lacks empirical support.124 Other scholars suggest that 
focusing on the spectrum and on inherent or conceptual strength may distract 
courts from considering more important factors, like acquired or commercial 
strength.125 
The existing literature provides insight into how and why a mark acquires 
source significance in context, but discounts the importance of the initial mark 
                                                                                                                     
file with author) [hereinafter Linford, Fanciful?] (reporting on psychological, linguistic, and 
marketing research that shows sounds chosen to comprise a fanciful mark convey 
information that consumers may not recognize on a conscious level, but that nevertheless 
shapes consumer perception of the product associated with the mark). 
 123 Courts and commentators primarily question the application of Abercrombie to non-
word marks like trade dress, which includes both product packaging and product features, 
and color used as a source signifier. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Inherent Distinctiveness, supra 
note 12, at 568 (arguing that the Abercrombie spectrum “provide[s] a useless veneer to 
intuitive judgments of protectability” in trade dress cases). 
 124 See, e.g., Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1635–36 (2006) [hereinafter Beebe, Empirical Study] 
(arguing that commercial strength in the marketplace developed over time correlates with 
mark owner victory in trademark litigation more than inherent or conceptual strength); Kevin 
Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton Beebe’s 
Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, 25 (confirming results of the Beebe study with a different data set); Lee et al., supra 
note 31, at 1078, 1089, 1091–92 (arguing, based on consumer studies, that “contextual 
markers” on trademark packaging are more important than the conceptual relationship of the 
word chosen as a mark to the product); Rebecca Tushnet, Looking at the Lanham Act: Images 
in Trademark and Advertising Law, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 861, 871–74 (2011) (criticizing 
continued reliance on the Abercrombie spectrum on the ground that it was offered by judges 
decades before the start of empirical trademark and marketing research, and that it may be a 
poor proxy for how readily consumers will recognize a given mark as an indication of 
source). 
 125 Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 738–43 (2004) 
(arguing that trademark law should focus on the context of trademark usage over categorical 
determinations); Timothy Denny Greene & Jeff Wilkerson, Understanding Trademark 
Strength, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 535, 582 (2013) (arguing as a normative matter that 
commercial strength should trump inherent strength in trademark inquiries).  
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selection. These critiques are not fully satisfying because they tilt too far toward 
marketplace context and commercial strength, failing to fully recognize how 
initial consumer perception of the connection between different meanings of a 
word can shape how the meanings are accessed, processed, and understood. It 
is true that commercial strength can and should trump conceptual strength when 
there is evidence of the former,126 but that does not mean courts should overlook 
inherent strength as a relevant starting point.127 In fact, generalizable baselines 
about how consumers perceive trademarks can aid courts in reaching the 
ultimate question of whether a mark has acquired commercial strength. 
Research on the interaction between conceptual and commercial strength is 
mixed. For instance, studies by Barton Beebe and Kevin Blum et al. identify 
some cases where developed commercial strength correlated with the outcome 
of trademark litigation but inherent strength did not.128 But such a finding does 
not belie the importance of inherent strength as a starting point, particularly in 
light of evidence from the Beebe and Blum studies that conceptual and 
commercial strength dovetail in many cases,129 and that conceptual strength 
frequently correlates with the ultimate outcome of litigation.130 
A different type of critique, closer in spirit to the proposal in this Article, 
argues that the law should focus on how consumers process a mark. Lisa 
Ouellette suggests that the best way to understand how consumers perceive a 
mark is by looking to crowdsourced evidence of consumer perception like 
search engine results.131 Ouellette’s proposal considers how to track changes in 
trademark meaning over time. Irina Manta instead recommends observing the 
subconscious or automatic reactions of survey respondents, which she argues 
are more likely to mirror the snap buying decisions of consumers than direct 
survey responses.132 Manta touches on a critical issue that this Article explores 
in more depth: Part III of this Article turns to research into language change to 
                                                                                                                     
 126 See, e.g., Linford, Adverse Possessor, supra note 52, at 727–28. But see Two Pesos, 
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 771 (1992) (rejecting invitation to hold that 
inherently distinctive trade dress that failed to acquire distinctiveness should be subject to 
forfeiture or defeasance). 
 127 Cf. Greene & Wilkerson, supra note 125, at 537–38 (noting that courts made the 
“correct[] shift towards a focus on actual market strength” over inherent strength, but the 
shift “has resulted . . . in a relatively unbounded free-for-all in which beleaguered judges are 
asked to examine any evidence that might be probative of acquired strength” (emphasis 
omitted)).  
 128 Blum et al., supra note 124, at 27. 
 129 Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 124, at 1638.  
 130 Id. at 1637–39; Blum et al., supra note 124, at 26 (reporting that arbitrary marks were 
positively correlated with an ultimate finding of likelihood of confusion, while descriptive 
marks were negatively correlated with an ultimate finding of likelihood of confusion). 
 131 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. 
REV. 351, 362 (2014). 
 132 Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural 
Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1036 
(2007). 
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explain how the connection between the mark and the product sold can channel 
consumer processing, and set a baseline for the acquisition of source 
significance. 
III. SEMANTIC SHIFT: HOW EXISTING WORDS ADD NEW MEANINGS 
This Part provides an overview of the etymological, theoretical, and 
cognitive literatures on language change necessary to understand how trademark 
acquisition is a form of semantic shift.133 Most word marks are created by 
adding new, source-signifying meaning to a pre-existing word, like APPLE for 
a brand of computers, GLEEM for a brand of toothpaste, or SEALTIGHT for a 
brand of fasteners. Like the creation of trademark meaning, semantic shift is 
driven and motivated by the need to communicate. And like other semantic shift 
events, the creation of trademark meaning introduces ambiguity as new 
meanings are added to existing words. The effectiveness of the attempted 
communication, and the ease of processing the ambiguity, depends largely on 
the nature of the relationship between a new word or meaning and the older 
word from which it is derived. 
This Part then explains how recent cognitive experiments support the 
etymological account with regard to how a listener or reader makes sense of a 
given use of a word with multiple meanings.134 These studies measure 
participant response times in word recognition tasks, and report that exposure 
to one meaning of a word increases the speed with which a listener or reader can 
access other related, or polysemous, meanings. These same studies indicate that 
exposure to a homonymous, or unrelated meaning, confers no processing 
advantage. The cognitive evidence bolsters theoretical and etymological 
accounts of language change and supports the division of new meanings into 
established linguistic classifications. 
If trademark law proposes to protect marks so they can (and to the extent 
that they) effectively convey information to consumers,135 the law must take 
                                                                                                                     
 133 See infra Part IV.A; see also Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 131–
40. This summary also informs the prescriptions for reforming trademark law in Part IV.B–
C, infra. 
 134 See generally Ekaterini Klepousniotou & Shari R. Baum, Disambiguating the 
Ambiguity Advantage Effect in Word Recognition: An Advantage for Polysemous but Not 
Homonymous Words, 20 J. NEUROLINGUISTICS 1 (2007); Ekaterini Klepousniotou, The 
Processing of Lexical Ambiguity: Homonymy and Polysemy in the Mental Lexicon, 81 BRAIN 
& LANGUAGE 205 (2002) [hereinafter Klepousniotou, Processing]; Klepousniotou, 
Reconciling, supra note 26. 
 135 See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2099, 2116 (2004) (“The three main policy reasons for protecting marks—reducing 
consumer search costs, maintaining and improving product quality, and remedying 
intentional deception—all relate to the quality of the product information available to 
consumers.”); Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 549 (2006) [hereinafter Bone, Hunting Goodwill] 
(“The core of trademark law . . . is based on a[n] . . . ‘information transmission model.’ This 
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consumer perception into account.136 Like any other change in language, 
investing a term with source significance requires the new meaning to reach a 
critical mass of popular acceptance. Generalizable rules about language change 
may provide insight into how the connection between the trademark and the 
product facilitate communication and make the mark more appealing. These 
rules may thus also provide important insight into how to better reshape 
trademark law to meet its information transmission objective. 
A. Motivations for Semantic Shift: Updating Language and Managing 
Ambiguity 
Language fluctuates constantly. New words are continually added to the 
lexicon as existing words gain new meanings. Twin motivations drive this 
semantic shift—enabling linguistic innovation and managing ambiguity.137 For 
instance, a speaker might add a new meaning to an existing word to give voice 
to a new concept,138 or to better describe objective changes in the world that 
require “a new name in a concrete situation.”139 When new meanings are added 
to existing words, the audience must discern which of a word’s multiple 
meanings is intended by the speaker. Different meanings of a single word can 
create what scholars call homonymic tension or semantic overload.140 But 
languages develop tools for dealing with this ambiguity,141 evolving “curative 
devices . . . to resolve ‘intolerable’ conflicts.”142 
The need to manage ambiguity also shapes semantic shift. Dirk Geeraerts 
postulates two rival principles of language efficiency: formal efficiency and 
conceptual efficiency. Formal efficiency seeks to optimize the directness of the 
relationship between a word and the thing it signifies, following a few simple 
                                                                                                                     
model views trademarks as devices for communicating information to the market and sees 
the goal of trademark law as preventing others from using similar marks to deceive or 
confuse consumers.”). 
 136 See Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 117–19. 
 137 See Dirk Geeraerts, Reclassifying Semantic Change, 4 QUADERNI DI SEMANTICA 217, 
226, 234 (1983) [hereinafter Geeraerts, Reclassifying].  
 138 Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of the 
Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, in HISTORICAL SEMANTICS AND COGNITION 61, 
82–83 (Andreas Blank & Peter Koch eds., 1999) [hereinafter Blank, New Meanings]; cf. 
TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that speaker-driven language change is a 
phenomenon that cuts across languages).  
 139 Blank, New Meanings, supra note 138, at 62 (describing the decision of the inventor 
of a self-propelled underwater munition to name it torpedo, after a species of stingray); see 
also Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 131–34. 
 140 STEPHEN ULLMANN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTICS 132 (2d ed. 1957) [hereinafter 
ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES] (quoting LEONARD ROBERT PALMER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MODERN LINGUISTICS 113 (1936)); Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 226, 234. 
This tension can arise over polysemous senses as well as homonymous meanings. 
 141 ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES, supra note 140, at 132.  
 142 Id. at 134. 
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rules. First, language will shorten phrases, like periodical paper to 
periodical,143 to economize expression.144 Second, confusing ambiguity is often 
resolved by shifting toward monosemy, i.e., one meaning for one word.145 In a 
lexicon that maximizes formal efficiency, ambiguity would be kept to a 
minimum, which can make communication easier. However, that clarity would 
come at its own cost: communicating a new concept would always require the 
creation of a unique word. 
Unlike formal efficiency, conceptual efficiency optimizes existing 
connections between related things. Using the same word to signify two or more 
unrelated concepts tends to confuse readers and listeners, even if context can 
subsequently clear up initial confusion. Diachronic research into language 
change over time indicates that listeners more easily comprehend new and 
ambiguous words when those words relate to existing meanings.146 For 
example, in Gallic French, two Latin terms for “rooster” and “cat” merged into 
one word, gat, that carried both meanings.147 To resolve that ambiguity, gat for 
“rooster” was abandoned, and two new words for ‘rooster’ were adopted. The 
first new word for rooster added a new meaning to an existing word: bigey, a 
word for “parish curate,” took on “rooster” as an additional meaning.148 
Geeraerts argues this addition is conceptually or metaphorically efficient 
because both the curate of a parish and the rooster in the chicken coop are 
overseers of a given domain.149 
Similarly, the word faisan for “pheasant” was modulated slightly to create 
a new word, azan for “rooster.”150 This new word was more conceptually 
efficient than a word plucked out of the air, because pheasants and roosters are 
birds with a similar appearance. The conceptual relationship makes it easier to 
overcome the confusion that can occur when one word has multiple meanings. 
In essence, Geeraerts argues that conceptual efficiency results in less 
semantic overload and is easier to process, even when formal inefficiency 
persists. In other words, it is easier to reach the intended meaning, rooster, when 
you start at pheasant or curate than when you start at cat.151 The audience can 
tolerate formal inefficiency when new meaning is added to an existing word, 
because the audience can use conceptual efficiency as an interpretive tool. 
As the Article explains in more detail in Part IV, most trademarks are 
created by adding new meaning to existing words, or fragments of words, rather 
                                                                                                                     
 143 DIRK GEERAERTS, THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 39 (2010) [hereinafter 
GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS]. 
 144 Robert J. Menner, The Conflict of Homonyms in English, 12 LANGUAGE 229, 237 
(1936). 
 145 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 227; see also infra Part IV.B–C. 
 146 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 225.  
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 225. 
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than invented from scratch.152 Those additions arguably reduce formal 
efficiency. But the connections between old and new meanings will allow the 
mark to trade on conceptual efficiency. 
B. Regularity in Semantic Shift: Distinguishing Polysemy from 
Homonymy 
The previous Section explained that semantic shift occurs when a speaker 
needs to say something new, and often happens in a manner that reduces 
confusing ambiguity. This Section describes how semantic shift occurs in 
predictable patterns across languages.153 Those patterns can shape the 
acquisition of trademark meaning, which at its base is a form of semantic shift. 
The following table summarizes several regular forms of semantic shift, and 
whether the shift is formally or conceptually efficient.154 
Table 3: Regular Semantic Shift and Formal v. Conceptual Efficiency 
Semantic Innovation / Linguistic 
Relationship 
Formal 
Efficiency 
Conceptual 
Efficiency 
Monoseme: 
Only one meaning High 
Low (New word, 
no relationship) 
Homonym: 
No connection between existing 
meanings and the new meaning 
Low Low 
Metaphor: 
Figurative connection between existing 
meanings and the new sense 
Low High 
Metonym: 
Literal or contiguous connection between 
existing and new sense, like feature for 
the whole 
Ex.: Green Beret from distinctive 
headgear worn by U.S. Army Special 
Forces shifts to serve as a nickname for 
the organization and its members 
Low High 
 
                                                                                                                     
 152 See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 472 
n.97 (2009) (comparing the originality required to create a fanciful, coined mark to the 
appropriation of pre-existing words that characterizes the creation of arbitrary, suggestive, 
or descriptive marks). 
 153 TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, at 3. 
 154 See also supra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
2015] FALSE DICHOTOMY 1395 
Some new entries into the lexicon are brand new words. When coined, these 
monosemes have a singular meaning.155 The term monoseme came into 
common usage to describe technical medical terms at the turn of the 20th 
century, but has since been applied to certain prominent brands. For example, 
David Crystal points to Microsoft as an example of a monosemous term.156 Any 
new word made up whole cloth will be a monoseme, at least at first. 
New meanings are added to existing words in two primary ways: polysemy 
and homonymy. Polysemy describes the addition of a new meaning that is 
etymologically related to the existing meaning of a word.157 Linguists posit that 
polysemes are interrelated in such a way that the reader or listener generates 
multiple meanings from a single, central, sense.158 For example, a bank is 
simultaneously a financial institution, the building in which the financial 
institution is housed, any number of institutions that store things (like a blood 
bank), and a synonym for “rely upon,” i.e., “You can bank on it.”159 All those 
meanings were derived from the Italian term for bench, which was “extended in 
Italian to [also mean] ‘tradesman’s stall, counter, [or] money changer’s 
table.’”160 
Polysemous shifts regularly occur in two ways: metaphoric and 
metonymic.161 Metaphoric shifts are based on a specific analogous similarity 
between different concepts.162 For instance, broadcast originally meant 
scattering seed “abroad over the whole surface, instead of . . . sow[ing] in drills 
or rows”;163 later came to mean scattering some thing widely abroad;164 and was 
eventually used to refer to the process of disseminating a radio or television 
signal.165 Crane, a bird with a long neck and legs, was likewise extended 
                                                                                                                     
 155 DAVID CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS 191 (2006) (pointing to “Microsoft” as 
an example of a monosemous term); see also Mononym, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/238541 [http://perma.cc/Y92LSLLS] (“Chiefly Med. Obs., 
A technical name consisting of one word only.”). Monosemy is a circumstance where words 
or phrases have a single meaning, or where there is an absence of ambiguity. See generally 
CHARLES RUHL, ON MONOSEMY: A STUDY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (1989). 
 156 CRYSTAL, supra note 155, at 191. While polysemes and homonyms are shared 
meanings for the same word, a monoseme stands apart from other lexemes. 
 157 Allan defines polysemy as “the property of an expression with more than one 
meaning.” 1 KEITH ALLAN, LINGUISTIC MEANING § 3.3.1 (1986). 
 158 Klepousniotou & Baum, supra note 134, at 4 (positing that polysemes have a single 
core meaning from which interrelated senses are derived, while homonyms have mutually 
exclusive meanings, one of which must be selected before further processing can occur). 
 159 WILLIAM CROFT & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 109–10 (2004). 
 160 Bank, n.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15237 
[http://perma.cc/AT85-8UTE]. 
 161 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 27. 
 162 GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 143, at 26–27. 
 163 Broadcast, adj., adv., and n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/23507 [http://perma.cc/5HUY-JXPE]. 
 164 Id.  
 165 Id.  
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metaphorically to a machine with a projecting arm used to raise and lower heavy 
weight.166 
A metonymic shift is instead a change based on contiguity or connection 
between concepts or an understood association.167 For instance, the word horn 
as it referred to “horn of an animal” was eventually used to describe a “wind 
instrument.” The shift was conceptually efficient because the use of animal 
horns as musical instruments made the new meaning of horn as a word for a 
musical instrument easier to process and remember.168 
Another standard metonymic shift is a part–whole substitution, where “the 
meaning of the whole is transferred to a word that originally designated only a 
part of the whole.”169 This shift often happens in political reporting, where the 
British Government is referred to collectively by the address of the Prime 
Minister’s residence, Number 10 (as in Downing Street),170 and the U.S. 
government is identified collectively as Washington.171 In other cases, a 
distinguishing feature is used to represent the whole, like Green Beret for the 
military unit famous for wearing the distinctive headgear.172 
Metaphoric and metonymic shifts are not formally efficient, because they 
violate the tendency toward monosemy, i.e., one meaning for each word.173 
They are nevertheless conceptually efficient, because the new meanings are 
cognitively related to existing meanings.174 For the listener, every addition of a 
new term introduces potentially confusing ambiguity,175 but when the new term 
is related to other terms familiar to the hearer, the ambiguity can be more readily 
resolved.176 As Geeraerts explained, adding new meanings that are related to 
existing meanings is generally preferred to the alternative.177 For the speaker, 
these polysemous shifts provide flexibility to communicate in new 
                                                                                                                     
 166 Crane, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/43797 
[http://perma.cc/CLK8-BEMS]. 
 167 TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, at 28; see also Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Process 
and Products in Making Sense of Tropes, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 252, 258–59 (Andrew 
Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (“[M]etonymy expresses simple contiguous relations between 
objects, such as part-whole, cause-effect, and so on.”).  
 168 Andreas Blank, Co-Presence and Succession: A Cognitive Typology of Metonymy, 
in METONYMY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 169, 182 (Klaus-Uwe Panther & Günter Radden 
eds., 1999) [hereinafter Blank, Co-Presence]. 
 169 D. GARY MILLER, ENGLISH LEXICOGENESIS 110 (2014). Some scholars distinguish 
between metonymy and synecdoche. Id. 
 170 Willem B. Hollmann, Semantic Change, in ENGLISH LANGUAGE: DESCRIPTION, 
VARIATION AND CONTEXT 301, 305 (Jonathan Culpeper et al. eds., 2009). 
 171 M. JIMMIE KILLINGSWORTH, APPEALS IN MODERN RHETORIC: AN ORDINARY-
LANGUAGE APPROACH 130 (2005). 
 172 MILLER, supra note 169, at 111. 
 173 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 174 See Geerarerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 234.  
 175 Id. at 225. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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circumstances.178 Returning to the example of rooster, discussed above,179 the 
connection between rooster and pheasant is metonymic—the two birds share a 
body type and common features. The connection between rooster and curate is 
metaphoric. A rooster acts in his henhouse domain as a curate acts in his parish. 
Both shifts were conceptually efficient, and thus preferable over rooster and cat 
sharing the word gat. 
Unlike metonyms and metaphors, homonyms are unrelated meanings for the 
same word, and both cognitively and formally inefficient.180 Homonyms look 
or sound the same,181 but are usually etymologically distinct and come from 
different roots. For example, while the word “bank” can be used to describe a 
financial institution or the land at the edge of a river or stream,182 those 
meanings are homonymous, stemming from independent and unrelated sources. 
As discussed in Part III.C, infra, recent cognitive experiments indicate that 
homonymous meanings operate as distinct concepts in the minds of the audience 
interpreting ambiguity, while polysemous meanings are stored as interrelated 
senses and are thus more easily processed and accessed. Thus, for a word with 
homonymous meanings, it is difficult, but not impossible, to simultaneously 
construe a given use of the word under both meanings.183 
Finally, while both polysemy and homonymy are formally inefficient 
because they result in ambiguity, Dirk Geeraerts argues that polysemous 
ambiguity “is based on a conceptually efficient metaphorical process.”184 As a 
result, a shift that adds polysemous ambiguity may be well received by the 
audience despite increasing formal inefficiency. There is thus some tendency 
for language to shift away from homonymous ambiguity toward polysemous 
ambiguity. As the next Section discusses, the relative ease of comprehending 
polysemous ambiguity compared to homonymous ambiguity is supported not 
only by diachronic accounts of language change over time, but also by recent 
cognitive research. 
                                                                                                                     
 178 Dirk Geeraerts, Diachronic Prototype Semantics. A Digest, in HISTORICAL 
SEMANTICS AND COGNITION, supra note 138, at 91, 101–03. 
 179 See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 180 Linguists sometimes differentiate between homonymous meanings (in effect, a new 
word sharing a similar form or sound) and polysemous senses (a new sense or variation on 
an existing meaning of a particular word). Technically, it is more accurate to say that 
homonyms are different words with the same lexeme—a collection of letters and sounds that 
comprise an identifiable unit. Each homonymous word is a separate lexical entry. 
 181 For the sake of simplicity, I include within homonymy both homophones (lexemes 
that sound the same but have different written forms and different meanings) and 
homographs (lexemes with the same written form but different pronunciations and 
meanings). See generally Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134.  
 182 Bank, supra note 160. 
 183 CROFT & CRUSE, supra note 159, at 112. 
 184 Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 137, at 225. 
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C. Cognitive Research: Processing Ambiguous Words 
The etymological and theoretical accounts of semantic shift discussed in 
Parts III.A & B are supported by recent cognitive research that has detected 
statistically significant differences in the way listeners and readers access and 
process ambiguity across different categories of words. This experimental 
evidence suggests that listeners and readers who are confronted with ambiguous 
words rely on distinct processing mechanisms to access polysemous senses and 
homonymous meanings.185 In other words, studies have identified significant 
differences in cognitive processing between homonymy and polysemy.186 
While exposure to a polysemous meaning helps the audience access or recall 
other polysemous meanings, exposure to a homonymous meaning provides no 
aid in accessing other homonymous meanings. The following table summarizes 
those findings. 
Table 4: Cognitive Processing Advantage Conferred by Different Types of 
Ambiguous Words 
Linguistic 
Relationship Measured Processing Advantage 
Metonymic 
Polysemy 
Processing advantage over metaphoric polysemy, 
homonymy, and control words in all lexical tasks 
Metaphoric 
Polysemy 
Processing advantage over homonymy and control 
words in some lexical tasks 
Homonymy No processing advantage over control words in any lexical task 
 
Early research into cognitive language processing posited that exposure to 
one meaning of a word with multiple meanings would aid in recognition of those 
other meanings. Several recent psycholinguistic and neurolinguistic studies by 
Ekaterini Klepousniotou and others report that it is not the existence of multiple 
meanings but the relationship between the meanings that affects audience 
recognition.187 In these studies, respondents completed lexical tasks more 
                                                                                                                     
 185 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 42. 
 186 Id. at 25 (citing studies by Tamiko Azuma & Guy C. Van Orden, Why SAFE is Better 
Than FAST: The Relatedness of a Word’s Meanings Affects Lexical Decision Times, 36 J. 
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 484 (1997); Lyn Frazier & Keith Rayner, Taking on Semantic 
Commitments: Processing Multiple Meanings vs. Multiple Senses, 29 J. MEMORY & 
LANGUAGE 181 (1990); Steven Frisson & Martin J. Pickering, The Processing of Metonymy: 
Evidence from Eye Movements, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1366 (1999); Jennifer Rodd 
et al., Making Sense of Semantic Ambiguity: Semantic Competition in Lexical Access, 46 J. 
MEMORY & LANGUAGE 245 (2002); John N. Williams, Processing Polysemous Words in 
Context: Evidence for Interrelated Meanings, 21 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RES. 193 (1992)). 
 187 See generally Klepousniotou & Baum, supra note 134; Klepousniotou, Reconciling, 
supra note 26. 
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quickly when presented with polysemous words—i.e., words having multiple 
related senses. Both metonymic and metaphoric polysemes conferred 
statistically significant processing advantages over control words in laboratory 
settings.188 While both types of polysemes provided processing advantages 
compared to control words, metonyic polysemes conferred processing 
advantages more consistently across multiple experiments than metaphoric 
polysemes. In addition, metonymic polysemes conferred a statistically 
significant processing advantage compared with metaphoric polysemes. 
Metonymic polysemes also conferred a statistically significant processing 
advantage over homonyms. Metaphoric polysemes conferred a statistically 
significant advantage compared to homonyms in some studies. In other studies, 
the advantage conferred over homonyms was measurable but not statistically 
significant. Unlike metaphoric and metonymic polysemes, homonyms provided 
no processing advantage over control words across multiple studies.189 A 
different series of experiments conducted by Devorah Klein and Gregory 
Murphy also observed a significant difference in the processing of polysemous 
words as opposed to homonymous words, although they described both effects 
as minor.190 
The studies by Klepousniotou and Klein & Murphy suggest that for 
polysemes, the existence of multiple related senses of a word makes it easier to 
access the word in the reader’s mental lexicon.191 When there are several 
apparently identical words with polysemous or related meanings, they are 
mentally stored in a way that facilitates processing and recognizing the word. 
However, these studies also indicate that homonymous meanings convey no 
such processing advantage. Klepousniotou concludes from this evidence that 
homonymous words have multiple meanings with distinct representations in the 
mental lexicon.192 Homonymous words are thus stored as different entries and 
                                                                                                                     
 188 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 29. While the result was not 
statistically significant, in one study homonymous words were processed more slowly than 
the control words. Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Devorah E. Klein & Gregory L. Murphy, Paper Has Been My Ruin: Conceptual 
Relations of Polysemous Senses, 47 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 548, 551 (2002); see also id. 
at 556–57 (finding, in categorization tasks, “an advantage for the polysemous words over the 
homonyms, and thus that the polysemous items share more connections than just a repeated 
word. The polysemous senses have more conceptual coherence than the different homonym 
meanings do.”); id. at 563–64 (finding, in induction tasks, that “polysemous items had 
stronger induction than homonyms” and that “[t]he closer two senses were, the stronger the 
induction from one to the other”). But see Devorah E. Klein & Gregory L. Murphy, The 
Representation of Polysemous Words, 45 J. MEMORY & LANGUAGE 259, 259 (2001) (finding, 
contrary to theory of semantically shared polysemous senses, that using a word in one sense 
provided no processing advantage for using it in a difference sense, but instead slowed down 
the second use, relative to a control condition). 
 191 See also Rodd et al., supra note 186, at 245 (finding a significant ambiguity 
advantage in lexical decision tasks for polysemous words with multiple related senses, and 
a delay for homonymous words with multiple unrelated meanings). 
 192 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 29, 42. 
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accessed separately in the mental lexicon.193 As a result, the speed with which 
the word is accessed may be reduced because multiple conflicting meanings are 
competing for activation in the reader’s mind.194 On the other hand, the 
difference in processing speed suggests that polysemes have a single 
representation with various senses and that, for the listener or reader, there is 
little or no semantic overload that might compromise the activation process.195 
At first glance, metaphors may appear to occupy a middle ground between 
metonymic polysemy and homonymy, supporting earlier theories that lexical 
ambiguity occurs on a spectrum.196 However, the similarities between metaphor 
and metonym are greater than their differences, and are certainly greater than 
similarities between metaphor and homonym. 
Like the cognitive research summarized above, marketing research often 
measures the speed of survey completion as a way to gauge implicit, 
subconscious, or unconscious responses. Processing speed can provide a clearer 
picture of how marks communicate and why marks are more effective than 
consumer responses to direct questions. As in other contexts, instantaneous or 
subconscious processing is often more powerful, and certainly more automatic, 
than deliberate decision-making mechanisms.197 
It can nevertheless be problematic to extrapolate consumer habits from 
processing delays in laboratory experiments.198 Some scholars have questioned 
what response time might actually tell us about consumer decisions because it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to “know at what point a response delay becomes 
enough to change a purchase decision.”199 Thus, a delay in response time might 
not be “enough to justify realigning [trademark] doctrine.”200 
                                                                                                                     
 193 Id.  
 194 Id. at 29. 
 195 Id.; see also supra notes 157–60, 191, and accompanying text. 
 196 Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 26, at 29 (citing Jurij D. Apresjan, Regular 
Polysemy, 142 LINGUISTICS 5 (1974)). 
 197 See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006) (“The very existence of implicit bias poses a 
challenge to legal theory and practice, because discrimination doctrine is premised on the 
assumption that, barring insanity or mental incompetence, human actors are guided by their 
avowed (explicit) beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.”); L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency 
and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2041 (2011) (discussing how to deal 
with implicit bias in policing and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Mark Spottswood, 
Bridging the Gap Between Bayesian and Story-Comparison Models of Juridical Inference, 
13 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 47, 54–56 (2014) (describing the effect of System 1 
unconscious processing on decision making). 
 198 Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 527–28 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Gone]. But see Chris 
Pullig et al., Brand Dilution: When Do New Brands Hurt Existing Brands?, 70 J. MARKETING 
52, 63–64 (2006) (finding statistically significant effects on brand consideration and choice 
from exposure to dilutive ads even after a five-day delay). 
 199 Tushnet, Gone, supra note 198, at 528. 
 200 Id. at 564. 
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But this critique may be misguided  because the speed of the first response 
is often conversely related to the ease of subsequently changing the respondent’s 
perspective. An instantaneous response, often referred to as System I 
processing, can be difficult to dispel even when a person is presented with new 
information that calls the first impression into question. Indeed, when faced with 
evidence that contradicts a quick initial impression, many individuals will 
double down on that initial impression.201 In fact, careful deliberation can 
actually reinforce the first impulse rather than correct it. Thus, subconscious or 
unconscious responses should not be discounted as easy to correct simply 
because they occur quickly. If the initial instantaneous connection between the 
word and the mark excavates a processing channel, it may be relatively difficult 
to close off the channel or redirect information flowing through it. Thus, 
assuming that the effect of unconscious processing will be short-lived may be 
mistaken. 
In addition, an implicit response may better predict future behavior than an 
explicit response for three main reasons.202 First, the implicit approach may 
uncover attitudes that consumers themselves have not recognized.203 Second, 
implicit measurements can better reveal the factors driving social behavior than 
explicit measurements.204 Finally, implicit measurements can better predict 
actual product selection than self-reported measures.205 
Turning to semantic shift literature for insights into trademark doctrine also 
provides an opportunity to address a related concern raised by Rebecca Tushnet: 
survey evidence is often viewed with skepticism because it can be distorted to 
favor the party paying for the survey.206 To date, the semantic shift literature 
has not been infected with marketing or litigant money, and the aforementioned 
studies look to establish rules applicable across time and across languages. An 
understanding of how language changes over time, and how the relationship of 
words can affect processing speed, may help the law see beyond specific survey 
evidence generated for litigation by providing generalizable rules about 
language change that can be applied in the trademark context. The next Part 
applies semantic shift research to trademark law, and explains how a suggestive 
mark, like a descriptive mark, trades on the relationship between existing 
product-related and new source-signifying meanings. 
                                                                                                                     
 201 See Spottswood, supra note 197, at 54–56; cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand 
Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 740 (2012) (arguing against a 
multifactor test to correct perceived problems in the scope of the derivative work right 
because “[w]e are very bad at understanding our own reactions. The reasons we give for our 
decisions tend to be wrong or easily manipulable without our awareness.”). 
 202 GERALD ZALTMAN, HOW CUSTOMERS THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE MIND OF 
THE MARKET 115–16 (2003); cf. Manta, supra note 132, at 1036. 
 203 ZALTMAN, supra note 202, at 115.  
 204 Id. at 115. 
 205 Id. at 116. Zaltman is also an advocate of neuroimaging. Id. at 117. 
 206 See Tushnet, Gone, supra note 198, at 568. 
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IV. SUGGESTIVE TRADEMARKS ARE NOT INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE 
This Part marshals semantic shift literature to provide a limited defense for 
the Abercrombie spectrum, and more importantly, to highlight a critical flaw 
therein—treating a suggestive mark as inherently distinctive. As I describe 
below, the relationship between either a suggestive or a descriptive mark and 
the product sold is polysemous. Selecting a descriptive mark, which is 
metonymically related to the product identified, or a suggestive mark, which is 
metaphorically related to the product, connects the mark to the product in a 
manner that will readily allow consumers to slip between source-signifying and 
product-designating meanings. As a result, it is unlikely that either the 
descriptive or suggestive mark inherently functions as a source signifier. In 
addition, those polysemous connections may allow the mark owner to benefit 
from processing advantages not conveyed by arbitrary marks, which are 
unrelated (or homonymous in relation) to the good or service designated. 
Trademark law aims to protect a mark so that it can convey accurate 
information to consumers and extend its strongest protection to those marks that 
most clearly indicate source. If the law is to properly distinguish “inherently 
distinctive” marks from those that send mixed signals to consumers or evoke 
qualities of the product sold, then protection should not automatically extend to 
a suggestive mark on its first use in commerce. This Part concludes with 
proposals for reforming trademark law in accordance with this insight. 
A. Linguistics and Trademark Communication 
This Article argues that trademark acquisition is like any other form of 
semantic shift—a process by which new meaning is added to the lexicon. 
Research into semantic shift teaches that like the creation of trademarks, 
language change generally is driven by the need to find a new name or express 
a new idea. Those changes can create confusing ambiguity.207 Semantic shift 
typically follows paths that reduce confusing ambiguity. For example, language 
tends to shift by adding related or polysemous meanings to existing words 
because the connection between meanings helps the reader or listener recognize 
and understand the new meaning. As trademark acquisition is a form of semantic 
shift, linguistic theory and cognitive research may provide insight into how 
trademark law can better reflect consumer perception and thus economize 
consumer search and reduce consumer confusion. 
The Abercrombie spectrum is challenged for a litany of reasons, including 
failing to accurately reflect the best evidence of consumer perception and 
                                                                                                                     
 207 STEPHEN ULLMANN, SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF MEANING 
209–10 (1962) (“Whenever a new name is required to denote a new object or idea, we can 
do one of three things: form a new word from existing elements; borrow a term from a foreign 
language or some other source; lastly, alter the meaning of an old word.”). As Ullmann 
recognized half a century ago, “[t]he need to find a new name is . . . an extremely important 
cause of semantic changes.” Id. at 210. 
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distracting courts from more critical inquiries.208 While it would be a mistake 
for trademark disputes to depend entirely on the Abercrombie category to which 
a mark is assigned, the spectrum maintains some surprising utility in identifying 
the conceptual strength of trademarks. The application of linguistic theory and 
cognitive research helps resolve some of the perceived conflict between the 
formalism of the Abercrombie spectrum and the contextualism of standard 
trademark critiques. At its core, the Abercrombie spectrum reflects solid 
linguistic principles about how meaning is typically added to the lexicon. Many 
critiques of the Abercrombie spectrum are thus overstated.209 However, while 
the Abercrombie categories are generally consistent with our best understanding 
of semantic shift, trademark law draws the boundary of inherent distinctiveness 
in the wrong place.210 
As discussed in Part III.C, recent cognitive experiments indicate that the 
relationship between different meanings of the same word affect audience 
comprehension and processing.211 Thus, the categorical differences in the 
widely adopted Abercrombie spectrum, while not outcome determinative, 
remain a useful starting point for understanding how consumers interact with 
trademarks. The Abercrombie categories, which have had a substantial impact 
on the development of trademark law, accurately reflect well-understood 
differences between monosemes, homonyms, and polysemes. My scholarship is 
the first to relate the Abercrombie categories to the regular forms of language 
change they embody.212 Table 5 summarizes the discussion that follows, 
charting the relationship between Abercrombie categories and linguistic 
categories of new and ambiguous words.213 
                                                                                                                     
 208 See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text. 
 209 See supra notes 123–32 and accompanying text (providing a summary of those 
critiques). 
 210 See infra Part IV.B. 
 211 See supra Part III.C. 
 212 See generally Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1. 
 213 An earlier version of this table was first published in Linford, “Generic” 
Trademarks, supra note 1, at 134–35. See generally id. for a critique of how “generic” terms 
are not protected even when they acquire strong source significance. 
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Table 5: Relationship Between Types of Language Change and Trademarks 
Along the Abercrombie Spectrum 
Semantic Category 
(relationship between 
existing 
words/meanings and 
new word/meaning) 
Abercrombie Spectrum 
(relationship between mark and 
product offered) 
Legal Consequences 
Protectability Inherent Strength 
Monoseme: 
Only one meaning 
Fanciful mark: 
Coined for use as a trademark, 
not derived from a pre-existing 
word 
Ex.: XEROX for photocopiers 
Inherently 
protectable on 
first use 
Presumed 
strong 
Homonym: 
No connection between 
existing meanings and 
the new meaning 
Arbitrary mark: 
Derived from a pre-existing 
word that has no connection 
with the product sold 
Ex.: APPLE for computers 
Metaphor: 
Figurative connection 
between existing 
meanings and the new 
sense 
Suggestive mark: 
Pre-existing word with some 
connection to the marked 
product. Consumers make 
connection between mark and 
product via an “imaginative 
leap” Ex.: SKINVISIBLE for 
transparent adhesive bandages; 
GLEEM for toothpaste 
Varies—some 
courts 
presume 
suggestive 
marks are 
weaker than 
arbitrary and 
fanciful marks 
Metonym: 
Literal or contiguous 
connection between 
existing and new sense, 
like feature for the 
whole. Ex.: Green 
Beret from distinctive 
headgear worn by U.S. 
Army Special Forces 
shifts to serve as a 
nickname for the 
organization and its 
members 
Descriptive mark: 
Pre-existing term with a clear 
connection to the product sold, 
via a direct description of a 
product feature 
Ex.: SEALTIGHT for fasteners 
Protectable 
only with 
evidence of 
source 
significance 
Presumed 
weak 
Restriction: 
Word formerly used to 
describe general 
category narrowed to 
represent a prototypical 
member of the category 
Ex.: hound narrowed 
from any dog to large 
hunting dog 
Ex ante generic mark: 
Word whose meaning has 
shifted from a class of products 
to one particular brand. 
Ex.: HOG for Harley Davidson 
motorcycles denied protection, 
despite evidence of shift, on 
grounds of trademark 
incapacity. 
Unprotectable, 
even with 
evidence of 
source 
significance 
Not 
considered 
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Generally, the phenomena observed in tracing semantic shift can also be 
observed as firms seek to develop trademarks. Some trademarks are formed 
from pre-existing words, while others are surprising and new. As the following 
Sections explain in more detail, these Abercrombie categories (fanciful, 
arbitrary, descriptive, and suggestive) each mirror a regular manifestation of 
semantic change (monosemy, homonymy, metonymic polysemy, and 
metaphoric polysemy). This overlap indicates that research into semantic shift 
may provide valuable insight into the relationship between the Abercrombie 
categories and the conceptual strength of trademarks. A thorough understanding 
of this relationship is particularly important in light of the fact that trademark 
plaintiff win rates generally mirror the conceptual strength traditionally assigned 
to Abercrombie categories214: the “weaker” the mark, the fewer the cases won 
by the plaintiff.215 
1. Monosemous Fanciful Trademarks 
At the strong end of the Abercrombie spectrum we find fanciful trademarks. 
Unlike arbitrary and suggestive marks, fanciful marks are typically unrelated to 
pre-existing lexemes. Words like XEROX216 and KODAK217 are “fanciful” in 
origin because they are coined specifically for use as trademarks.218 It may seem 
puzzling at first to describe the creation of a fanciful or coined mark as a 
semantic shift because those marks are often described as made up from whole 
cloth.219 Nevertheless, creating a fanciful mark requires forging a new word 
from existing morphemes, the smallest building blocks of language. The process 
                                                                                                                     
 214 Beebe, Empirical Study, supra note 124, at 1637–38. 
 215 Id. Beebe discounted that result as turning on the way conceptual strength of a mark 
feeds into commercial strength in the marketplace. Id. at 1639. Beebe’s dismissal might turn 
in part on the failure of some courts to categorize marks in reported opinions as part of a 
likelihood of confusion determination. Id. at 1635–36. 
 216 The term XEROX is ostensibly drawn from the technical name for the photocopying 
process, xerography, itself derived from Greek words for “dry” and “writing.” SCM Corp. 
v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 985 n.2 (D. Conn. 1978). 
 217 See History: George Eastman, KODAK, http://www.kodak.com/ek/us/en/corp/ 
aboutus/heritage/georgeeastman/default.htm [http://perma.cc/6VJJ-4G3A] (“I devised the 
name myself. The letter ‘K’ had been a favorite with me—it seems a strong, incisive sort of 
letter. It became a question of trying out a great number of combinations of letters that made 
words starting and ending with ‘K.’ The word ‘Kodak’ is the result.” (quoting George 
Eastman, founder of Kodak)). 
 218 Eve V. Clark & Herbert H. Clark, When Nouns Surface as Verbs, 55 LANGUAGE 767, 
802 (1979) (“New technologies seem to be responsible for many of the denominal verbs that 
are now very common—Xerox, telephone, wire, radio, and paperclip. In each case, a 
complicated situation is expressed economically in a single verb.”). 
 219 MCCARTHY, supra note 17, § 11:4. There are some close calls where the creation of 
some fanciful marks might seem homonymous. For example, Google selected its housemark 
by misspelling googol, the designation for one followed by 100 zeros. Math geeks know that, 
but many others do not. 
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of creating a fanciful mark is essentially monosemous.220 The mark owner adds 
an entirely new entry into the lexicon by coining a new word from raw linguistic 
material to identify its product. A fanciful mark is inherently distinctive because 
it has no other meaning, at least when initially coined. 
2. The Natural Homonymy of Arbitrary Trademarks 
Next on the Abercrombie spectrum we find arbitrary marks, where the word 
selected as a mark has pre-existing meaning that is homonymous or unrelated 
to the product designated.221 When establishing an arbitrary mark, the trademark 
owner applies an existing word to a product for which the word has not been 
commonly used and which neither suggests nor describes any ingredient, 
quality, or characteristic of the product.222 For example, the word “apple” is 
familiar to any English speaker, while the two-dimensional image of an apple 
can cross linguistic barriers and bring to mind the fruit to any individual who 
has seen an apple. When Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs first decided to sell 
computers under the APPLE trademark, there was at least one established 
meaning of “apple,” designating a category of fruit from a particular genus of 
tree,223 but no sense of APPLE as a brand of computer hardware and software. 
Neither the word apple nor the image of an apple brought to mind computers 
and computer programs until Wozniak and Jobs began selling personal 
computer kits in 1976 under the APPLE mark.224 Over time, the Apple 
Corporation added a new meaning to the word apple. Establishing an arbitrary 
trademark is thus a process of creating a new homonym: a new meaning for a 
pre-existing word that is unrelated to that word’s established meanings. 
                                                                                                                     
 220 See also Eric McCready, Unnatural Kinds, 40 J. PRAGMATICS 1817, 1819, 1821 
(2008) (stating that trademarks “exhibit one property of quotations that has been extensively 
discussed: TM takes (sequences of) words and treats them as (what amount to) singular 
terms,” perhaps indicating that other “natural” and “unnatural kinds” should have a single 
name, i.e., that “name-kind mapping should be one-one”).  
 221 See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text; see also Linford, “Generic” 
Trademarks, supra note 1, at 136–37. 
 222 See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219, 
1243 (D. Colo. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) (quoting jury instruction 
regarding the nature of an arbitrary mark). 
 223 Apple, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/9678 
[http://perma.cc/MJ2B-X7D8] (“The round firm fruit (a pome) of any of various wild and 
cultivated trees of the genus Malus . . . occurring in a wide variety of forms, colours, and 
flavours . . . .”). 
 224 OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL: THE REAL STORY OF APPLE 
COMPUTER, INC. 7 (1999); Stephen Wozniak, Homebrew and How the Apple Came to Be, in 
DIGITAL DELI (Steve Detlea ed., 1984), http://www.atariarchives.org/deli/ 
homebrew_and_how_the_apple.php [http://perma.cc/5AD7-CPK6]; see also APPLE, 
Registration No. 1078312 (APPLE for computers and computer programs recorded on paper 
and tape). 
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3. The Metonymic Connection Between the Descriptive Mark and the 
Product 
As described in Part II.A, a descriptive mark “forthwith conveys an 
immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods.”225 
Because of this close connection between the mark and its source, descriptive 
marks are not afforded a presumption of protectability. Instead, a descriptive 
term must acquire source significance prior to protection as a trademark. 
The product associated with a descriptive mark is related to the word or 
words from which the mark is drawn in a manner that resembles metonymic 
polysemy.226 A descriptive mark builds on a characteristic of the good or service 
with which it is associated, while a metonymic shift is a change based on an 
association or connection between concepts.227 The trademark owner seeks to 
secure protection in a mark that best reminds consumers of the product offered 
under the mark. For example, a term like SEALTIGHT for fasteners describes 
a quality a fastener should possess, and is thus descriptive in nature.228 The 
relationship between descriptive mark and product is contiguous and metonymic 
like the relationship between the Green Beret nickname and the special forces 
unit it identifies.229 
4. The Metaphoric Connection Between the Suggestive Mark and the 
Product 
Like a descriptive mark, a suggestive mark is derived from a word with a 
connection to the product identified. Instead of direct appropriation of a product 
feature as a source signifier, a suggestive mark is indirectly related to a feature 
of the product.230 For example, GLEEM for toothpaste evokes the way teeth 
should shine after brushing, but the connection is not as direct as a word like 
“clean.”231 Unlike a descriptive mark, the law treats a suggestive mark as 
“inherently distinctive” because courts perceive the connection between the 
mark and the product as so tenuous that consumers must make an imaginative 
leap to link mark and product.232 
                                                                                                                     
 225 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968)). 
 226 See also Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 1, at 138–39. 
 227 For instance, horn for “animal horn” added the sense of horn for “musical 
instrument,” due to the use of some animal horns as musical instruments or warning devices. 
Blank, Co-Presence, supra note 168, at 182; see also TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 24, 
at 28. 
 228 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 252 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 229 See supra notes 25, 172 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra notes 25, 172 and accompanying text. 
 231 See supra notes 25, 172 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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Suggestive marks occupy a midpoint between arbitrary and descriptive 
marks along the Abercrombie spectrum and were recognized much later than 
their categorical companions. Prior to the passage of the Lanham Act, 
descriptive marks were incapable of acquiring trademark protection. What we 
now call arbitrary and fanciful marks were protectable “technical” marks.233 
Courts were split on what to do with terms that were not clearly arbitrary nor 
exactly descriptive.234 For example, in Filley v. Fassett, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri noted that terms which were “either descriptions or suggestive of the 
style, character, or qualities of” the product could not be protected as a 
trademark.235 On the other hand, in O’Rourke v. Central City Soap Co., the 
district court opined that marks “suggestive of some supposed advantage to be 
derived from using [the product], or some effect produced by its use [are] 
ordinarily, though not always, upheld as valid trade-marks.”236 The law 
eventually distilled around the notion that suggestive marks, like arbitrary and 
fanciful marks, were inherently distinctive.237 But in light of semantic shift 
research, suggestive marks likely fall short of inherently indicating source. 
Thus, the courts made the wrong call. 
The process of creating a suggestive mark mirrors metaphoric polysemy. A 
suggestive mark is a type of metaphoric extension, not unlike the adoption of 
the word crane, for ‘a long-necked fishing bird,’ to also identify a construction 
machine with a long boom used to move heavy loads.238 Suggestive marks 
operate in metaphoric relationship to the words from which they are drawn,239 
requiring “the consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as to 
the nature of the[] goods” offered under that mark.240 For example, 
                                                                                                                     
 233 Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160 
n.8. 
 234 Educ. Dev. Corp. v. Econ. Co., 562 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing Abercrombie 
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 10 (2d Cir. 1976); and then citing Union 
Carbide Co. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
 235 Filley v. Fasset, 44 Mo. 168, 177 (1869). 
 236 O’Rourke v. Cent. City Soap Co., 26 F. 576, 578 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1885). 
 237 Bone, Hunting Goodwill, supra note 135, at 564 n.74 (citing AMASA C. PAUL, THE 
LAW OF TRADE-MARKS, INCLUDING TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 (1903) 
(reporting on cases that treated a suggestive mark as a technical trademark)). 
 238 See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
 239 Metaphoric extensions are based on a specific analogous similarity between 
concepts. GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 143, at 27. 
 240 Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (4th Cir. 1984)); see also TMEP, supra 
note 20, § 1209.01(a) (“Suggestive marks . . . when applied to the goods or services at issue, 
require imagination, thought, or perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of those 
goods or services. . . . [A] descriptive term . . . immediately tells something about the goods 
or services.”). As Judge Friendly wrote in Abercrombie, “[a] term is suggestive if it requires 
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.” 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting 
Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
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SKINVISIBLE was held to be suggestive for transparent adhesive bandages 
because nothing about the name SKINVISIBLE directly evokes the quality of 
adhesion.241 But SKINVISIBLE directly references the features of transparency 
and the skin as the surface for adhesion. The “imaginative process” used by 
consumers to connect a mark to the product sold is not like the process of 
comprehending the natural homonymy of an arbitrary mark. An arbitrary mark 
stands out because it is derived from a word entirely unrelated to the product 
offered for sale. 
The SKINVISIBLE mark is one of many for which the perceived distance 
between the mark and the product identified is a matter of reasonable 
disagreement.242 Courts are required to distinguish descriptive from suggestive 
marks because the consequences are severe, but as the next Section makes clear, 
trademark law mistakenly exaggerates the difference between suggestive and 
descriptive marks. Semantic shift research indicates that a metaphoric polyseme 
like a suggestive trademark enhances the connection between mark and product 
through processing advantages similar to those provided by a metonymic 
polyseme like a descriptive mark. In contrast, an arbitrary mark highlights the 
connection between mark and source due to the lack of connection between 
mark and product. 
B. The Suggestive Mark, Cognitive Efficiency, and Inherent 
Distinctiveness 
This Article presumes that the dominant economic rationale—securing the 
information transmission function of trademarks to economize consumer search 
and reduce consumer confusion—is a sufficient normative justification for 
trademark protection.243 This Section thus argues that the law correctly extends 
protection on first use to a fanciful or arbitrary mark and correctly withholds 
protection from a descriptive mark until there is evidence of source significance. 
But the law errs in extending protection on first use to a suggestive mark. 
                                                                                                                     
 241 Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180 (C.C.P.A. 
1972). 
 242 See supra Part II.B. 
 243 See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. This Article also presumes that courts 
are correct to construe marks as a whole, rather than considering their component parts. If 
that presumption is relaxed, there are reasons to suspect that many marks currently 
designated as fanciful are like descriptive marks to the extent that the individual sounds that 
comprise those marks carry meaning that communicates product characteristics. See Linford, 
Fanciful?, supra note 122 (arguing that in light of research into sound symbolism—how 
individual units of sound bear meaning even in some nonsense words—the perceived 
differences between descriptive marks and some fanciful marks may be overstated); see also, 
e.g., Richard R. Klink, Creating Brand Names with Meaning: The Use of Sound Symbolism, 
11 MARKETING LETTERS 5 (2000) (reporting two studies in which respondents perceived 
undisclosed products with imaginary brand names as likely to be smaller, faster, lighter 
(weight), softer, and/or more feminine depending on the sounds comprising the imaginary 
brand). 
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According to the economic account, trademarks are protected so they can 
(and to the extent that they) effectively transmit information about the source of 
the product to consumers and markets.244 Trademarks are protected from 
infringing uses so that consumers can rely on the mark to more easily find and 
purchase the product they desire from the source they prefer. “Inherently 
distinctive” trademarks are likewise protected from their first use in commerce 
because the law views them as possessing an innate capacity to transmit 
information about the source of the mark. Fanciful marks are inherently 
distinctive because they are new words coined for use as a trademark. On first 
use, a fanciful mark has no meaning other than its source signifying meaning. 
1. Linguistic Evidence: Arbitrary Marks Are Inherently Distinctive 
Arbitrary marks are also treated as inherently distinctive because there is no 
connection between the word chosen as a mark and the product offered. 
Linguists refer to such unrelated look-alike or sound-alike words as 
homonyms.245 Diachronic and cognitive research suggests that homonymous 
arbitrary marks are properly categorized as inherently distinctive because this 
lack of connection has measurable effects on language change over time and on 
how an audience processes ambiguity when a word’s multiple meanings are 
unrelated. 
Diachronic research, which considers change in meaning over time, 
observes a resistance to homonymous change but a disposition toward 
polysemous shift.246 Semantic shift is most commonly channeled towards 
change that adds related meanings to existing words, rather than unrelated or 
conflicting meanings.247 On the other hand, moving from one meaning to an 
unrelated meaning for the same word is not cognitively efficient. The lack of 
connection between the concepts impedes recognition and slows the ability of 
the audience to process ambiguity. 
Cognitive research likewise indicates that homonymy does not facilitate the 
resolution of ambiguity. Homonyms offered no processing advantage compared 
to control words.248 Study participants processed homonymous meanings like 
they processed dissimilar and unrelated words, rather than as senses of the same 
word.249 Participants appeared to treat two homonymous terms as entirely 
distinct linguistic units. This research suggests it is difficult to simultaneously 
construe an ambiguous word using two homonymous meanings.250 The brain 
                                                                                                                     
 244 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 245 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 246 See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 247 See supra notes 147–51 and accompanying text. 
 248 See Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134, at 214. 
 249 Id. at 215. 
 250 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
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treats them like conflicting meanings.251 Thus homonyms like bank for the land 
bounding a river and for a financial institution are likely to be treated as entirely 
different words, and exposure to one meaning can make it difficult to perceive 
the other. Likewise, apple for fruit and APPLE for computers are likely to be 
treated as entirely distinct concepts. 
The addition of an unconnected meaning to a pre-existing word seems 
somewhat unnatural, not unlike the scene in the movie Mean Girls where one 
member of a clique tries to start the trend of using “fetch,” as in the phrase “That 
is so fetch,” as a synonym for “cool” or “awesome.” She is quickly shot down 
by the leader of the clique with a frosty “Stop trying to make ‘fetch’ happen. It’s 
not going to happen.”252 
The unfamiliar nature of a homonymous addition does not make the creation 
of an arbitrary mark impermissible. Indeed, this jarring juxtaposition is what 
makes the arbitrary mark inherently distinctive. The difficulty of making the 
cognitive jump from an arbitrary mark to the associated product is a feature, not 
a bug, in the trademark regime. The lack of connection between mark and 
product helps the arbitrary mark stand out as a signifier of source. 
Using apple to designate a computer is inherently distinctive because it is 
difficult for the audience to process apple in the context of computer sales as 
anything other than a new, source-signifying way to use a recognizable 
combination of letters. That lack of relationship jars the audience in a way that 
signals the word chosen does new work as a trademark—an identifier of 
source—rather than to identify the product sold. The initial disconnect between 
mark and product forces the public to see the term as a trademark. This 
disconnect between original and new meanings suggests that consumers are 
likely to see a trademark like APPLE for computers as inherently source 
signifying, just as they see monosemous fanciful marks as inherently source 
signifying. 
2. Linguistic Evidence: Descriptive Marks Lack Inherent 
Distinctiveness 
Unlike an arbitrary mark, a descriptive mark is seen to lack the native 
capacity to indicate source from first use. Under the current doctrine, a 
descriptive mark, which is derived from a characteristic of the product offered 
for sale, does not inherently distinguish source. Evidence from the semantic shift 
literature supports this categorization. As discussed above, descriptive marks 
have a metonymic relationship with the product offered.253 Semantic shift 
literature shows that an audience can process ambiguity between polysemous 
                                                                                                                     
 251 Some scholars even posit that homonymous meanings are stored as separate words 
in the mental lexicon. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 252 MEAN GIRLS (Paramount Pictures 2004). 
 253 See supra Part IV.A.3. 
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senses—especially between metonyms—more easily than it can process jarring 
homonymous ambiguity. 
First, the diachronic evidence suggests a preference for semantic shift where 
there is a close metonymic connection between existing and new meanings. For 
example, the shift in Gallic French from faisan for ‘pheasant’ to azan for 
‘rooster’ added some ambiguity to language: sound-alikes can confuse an 
audience. The shift was nevertheless preferable to the previous ambiguity 
between gat for ‘rooster’ and for ‘cat.’254 Scholars like Geeraerts argue that an 
addition of meaning that connects old and new meanings is conceptually 
efficient, and thus more readily accepted by readers and listeners than 
homonymous ambiguity. 
Cognitive research also points to a connection between metonymic 
meanings that helps the audience resolve ambiguity. As mentioned above, early 
linguistic theories posited that any word with many meanings would be 
recognized more easily than a word with a single meaning. Recent research has 
refined that hypothesis. For example, Klepousniotou reports that when an 
ambiguous word shares multiple related meanings, the word is easier for readers 
and listeners to recognize. Study participants exposed to polysemes 
demonstrated statistically significant advantages in processing ambiguity, 
compared to their speed in processing other types of ambiguous or monosemous 
words.255 This advantage aided participants in distinguishing real words from 
random assortments of letters, and appeared to prime or subconsciously prepare 
study participants to remember or recognize related meanings.256 Unlike 
homonymous words, which convey no processing benefit and appear 
unconnected in the minds of survey participants, the research suggests that 
exposure to one meaning can trigger recognition of another related, or 
polysemous meaning.257 The effect is strongest when there is a metonymic 
connection between the meanings.258 The metonymic connection between 
descriptive mark and product sold is sufficiently close that the law properly 
concludes a descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive. Thus the law 
appropriately requires evidence of acquired distinctiveness before protecting a 
descriptive mark as a unique source signifier. 
3. Linguistic Evidence: Suggestive Marks Are Not Inherently Distinctive 
As discussed above, suggestive marks began as a makeweight between 
descriptive and arbitrary marks.259 Courts wrestling with the question of how to 
                                                                                                                     
 254 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
 255 See Klepousniotou, Processing, supra note 134, at 212–17.  
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 258 Study participants exposed to metonymic polysemes demonstrated clear processing 
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treat a suggestive mark eventually grouped them with fanciful and arbitrary 
marks. The law concedes a connection between the suggestive mark and the 
product offered, which is strikingly similar to the connection between the 
descriptive mark and the product sold. A descriptive mark lacks inherent 
distinctiveness due to the connection between mark and product. But the law 
perceives a larger gap between the suggestive mark and the product, a gap so 
wide that courts and scholars refer to the “imaginative leap” that the consumer 
must take to connect the mark to the product.260 The law thus designates the 
suggestive mark as inherently distinctive, capable of standing out as a source 
signifier from its first use in commerce. 
Research into semantic shift indicates the current doctrine makes too much 
of this imaginative leap. The case for treating a suggestive mark as inherently 
distinctive is much weaker than the case for an arbitrary mark. Grouping 
metaphoric suggestive marks with homonymous arbitrary marks indicates a 
failure to recognize how an audience processes metaphors and homonyms. A 
suggestive mark is less likely to be perceived as a source signifier from the 
consumer’s first exposure, because the metaphoric connection between mark 
and product has a stronger effect than the law currently recognizes. An arbitrary 
mark is inherently distinctive because the lack of relationship is jarring. A 
suggestive mark does not jar; it hints. 
Like a descriptive mark, a suggestive mark is derived from a feature of the 
product sold. A suggestive mark shares many properties with a descriptive mark. 
Those similarities indicate that suggestive marks likely accelerate a connection 
in the minds of consumers between mark and product more readily than between 
mark and source. 
Both descriptive and suggestive marks have a polysemous relationship to 
the product offered,261 which semantic shift research indicates aids in 
processing and recognizing multiple meanings. First, according to diachronic 
research, a metaphoric relationship between two meanings of the same word is 
cognitively efficient and thus a relatively easy form of ambiguity for the reader 
or listener to process, much like a metonymic relationship. Semantic shift is thus 
commonly channeled towards polysemous change, which includes metaphoric 
shift. For instance, Geeraerts notes the cognitive efficiency of shifting away 
from gat to represent both ‘cat’ and ‘rooster,’ and instead adding rooster as a 
second meaning to bigey.262 Bigey already signified a parish curate, so the 
addition of rooster decreased formal efficiency.263 Nevertheless, the metaphoric 
connection between the behavior of a curate in his parish and a rooster in his 
yard made the addition cognitively efficient.264 
Second, cognitive research by Klepousniotou and others indicate that, like 
metonyms, metaphors are processed as related senses of a single word stored 
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together in the mental lexicon of the audience, and thus quickly accessed and 
recognized.265 In other words, readers and listeners see metaphorically 
connected meanings as different aspects of the same word. Klepousniotou 
reports that in certain contexts, study participants exposed to metaphoric 
polysemes process those words more easily than words with multiple 
homonymous meanings, and more easily than words with one meaning.266 
While the cognitive processing benefit conferred by metaphors is not as 
consistent as the benefit conferred by metonyms, both types of polysemous 
relationships confer processing benefits that a homonymous relationship does 
not. 
The diachronic and cognitive research indicates that the suggestive mark is 
connected to the product offered through mechanisms that enhance product 
salience more than source significance. The law may thus err in presuming that 
a suggestive mark is inherently distinctive. If the economic search cost account 
favors marks that are inherently distinctive with relatively automatic protection, 
the law should not extend that favor to suggestive marks. In addition, the 
effectiveness of the metaphoric connection between suggestive mark and 
product may mean that suggestive marks benefit from some of the anti-
competitive advantages that caution against automatic protection of descriptive 
trademarks. The next Section considers this possibility. 
4. Suggestive Marks and Cognitive Free Riding 
Trademark law puts hurdles before the putative owner of a descriptive mark 
because of the danger that the mark owner may be able to “free ride” on an 
association between mark and product.267 As Lisa Ramsey notes, the descriptive 
mark itself “is attribute-identifying . . . provid[ing] information about the 
qualities and characteristics of the product.”268 This effect is independent of 
concerns about language depletion.269 Whether or not the descriptive term is the 
only or the best term available, the business that selects the descriptive term “is, 
in effect, free-riding off the attribute-identifying value of the descriptive 
term,”270 at least until the mark acquires distinctiveness. This benefit is 
consistent with the significant advantage that metonymic polysemes convey in 
processing linguistic ambiguity. It is thus reasonable to ask the mark owner to 
establish some level of source significance before protecting the descriptive 
mark. But as the semantic shift research indicates, the same processing 
advantages manifest in metaphoric connections like the link between a 
suggestive mark and the product offered. While a metaphoric connection is not 
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2015] FALSE DICHOTOMY 1415 
as obvious or quite as strong as a metonymic connection, it is often highly 
effective at bringing connected meanings to mind. For a suggestive mark, the 
metaphoric connection links mark and product, not mark and source. The 
adoption of a suggestive mark may thus also trigger problematic free riding by 
the mark owner,271 who may benefit from the tendency of consumers to embrace 
metaphoric shift. 
In light of the semantic shift research, the law should reconsider the 
suggestive–descriptive line. Suggestive marks are not as naturally distinctive as 
the law presumes. In fact, the suggestive–descriptive line may be difficult to 
draw precisely because in many cases, the difference is more imagined than real. 
Suggestive marks occupy the middle ground between arbitrary and descriptive 
marks, but grouping suggestive marks with arbitrary marks is inconsistent with 
current research on how those marks are likely to be processed. Thus, a 
suggestive mark should not be treated as inherently distinctive. The following 
table summarizes the findings and proposed changes to the law. The next 
Section examines potential changes in more detail. 
Table 6: Differences Between Descriptive, Suggestive, and Arbitrary 
Trademarks in Light of Cognitive Literature 
Abercrombie 
Category 
Linguistic 
Relationship 
Measured Processing 
Advantage 
Proposed Bar to 
Protectability 
Descriptive Metonymic Polysemy 
Consistent processing 
advantage in lexical 
tasks High bar—proof 
of source 
significance Suggestive Metaphoric Polysemy 
Significant 
processing advantage 
in lexical tasks in 
some contexts 
Arbitrary Homonymy 
No processing 
advantage in any 
lexical tasks 
Low bar—
inherently 
distinctive on 
first use 
C. Resetting the Inherent Distinctiveness Line 
As summarized in Part III, research into language change tells us how and 
why words gain new meanings, and how speakers and listeners deal with the 
ambiguity created when a word means more than one thing. The previous 
Section argued that a suggestive metaphoric mark is much less likely than an 
arbitrary mark to instantly signal its status as a trademark. On the other hand, a 
suggestive mark benefits from some of the same processing advantages as a 
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descriptive metonymic mark.272 Thus, the law should not treat a suggestive 
mark as inherently distinctive. 
Recognizing that suggestive marks are not inherently distinctive should 
drive several changes to the law. The most dramatic potential change would be 
to treat only fanciful and arbitrary marks as inherently distinctive. A mark 
derived from a pre-existing word would be treated as inherently distinctive, and 
thus protected without evidence of source significance, only if there was no 
connection between existing meanings or senses of the mark selected and the 
product sold. Arbitrary marks would thus continue to be treated as inherently 
distinctive, but suggestive marks would not. Suggestive marks would instead be 
treated like descriptive marks. Protection would thus extend to a suggestive 
mark only with some indication that the mark had acquired a secondary, source-
signifying meaning. The inquiry could work as it currently works for descriptive 
marks.273 
Redrawing the suggestive–descriptive line would require a statutory 
change. Currently, section 2 of the Lanham Act,274 the statute governing federal 
trademark protection, states that a trademark cannot be refused registration 
unless, inter alia, the mark is “merely descriptive of” the applicant’s product.275 
A suggestive mark is not inherently distinctive, but courts and trademark 
examiners would balk at defining it as “merely descriptive.” Thus, under the 
current statute, a suggestive mark may be registered upon first use, and federal 
trademark registration conveys nationwide rights in the mark.276 The statute 
could be amended so that a trademark could be refused registration if the mark 
either is not inherently distinctive or has not acquired secondary meaning, with 
“inherently distinctive” defined as a mark with no inherent connection between 
the product and mark selected (or more categorically, as an arbitrary or fanciful 
mark). 
Requiring evidence of source significance would delay some applications 
for trademark protection.277 For many applicants, a denial on descriptiveness 
grounds is overcome by waiting for five years. After five years of relatively 
exclusive use, the law presumes that a descriptive mark has acquired 
distinctiveness.278 
But treating a suggestive mark exactly like a descriptive mark might be an 
overcorrection. As discussed above, the cognitive research shows stronger and 
more consistent processing advantages for metonymic polysemes than 
                                                                                                                     
 272 See supra Part IV.B. 
 273 See supra Part II.A.  
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2015] FALSE DICHOTOMY 1417 
metaphoric polysemes.279 While a suggestive mark is not inherently distinctive 
like an arbitrary mark, it may not consistently convey the same processing 
advantages as a descriptive mark. Thus it might be safe to protect a suggestive 
mark earlier or more broadly than a descriptive mark, without protecting it from 
first use in commerce. If so, the law might properly continue to differentiate 
between suggestive and descriptive marks in some contexts. 
If descriptive marks confer a greater processing advantage than suggestive 
marks, even though the latter are not “inherently distinctive,” it could be 
appropriate to set a lower bar for suggestive marks to acquire distinctiveness 
than descriptive marks. This might be accomplished in trademark litigation by 
imposing a lower standard for finding acquired source significance if the mark 
is suggestive rather than descriptive.280 The law might also differentiate 
between descriptive and suggestive marks in commercial strength inquiries that 
constitute part of the standard trademark infringement analysis. For example, 
courts are currently split over whether a suggestive mark is entitled to a 
presumption of high commercial strength. A study conducted by Barton Beebe 
suggests that likelihood of confusion increases as the inherent strength of the 
mark increases along the Abercrombie scale. Beebe reported that courts found 
likelihood of confusion more frequently in cases where the senior user’s mark 
was categorized as suggestive compared to cases where the mark was 
categorized as descriptive.281 Perhaps then a suggestive mark would have to 
provide evidence of secondary meaning before qualifying for protection, but the 
lack of direct connection between mark and product could serve as a thumb on 
the scale in favor of commercial strength grounded in conceptual strength. 
The law might also allow the mark owner to register a suggestive mark with 
less evidence of source significance compared to, or after a shorter duration of 
substantially exclusive use than a descriptive mark. Pursuant to section 2(f) of 
the Lanham Act, substantially exclusive use of a descriptive mark for five years 
                                                                                                                     
 279 See supra Part IV.B.  
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mark is suggestive or descriptive. Id. 
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is prima facie evidence that the mark has acquired source significance.282 While 
five years looks like a unitary term, trademark examiners are actually instructed 
to apply differing levels of scrutiny to different types of marks when considering 
a section 2(f) application to register a trademark. For example, applications to 
register trade dress or marks derived from personal names do not automatically 
benefit from the five-year presumption.283 The USPTO could likewise preserve 
some space between descriptive and suggestive marks by internally 
distinguishing between them. The five-year presumption in section 2(f) could 
also be amended to allow the trademark office to accept fewer than five years 
of substantially exclusive use as prima facie evidence that a suggestive mark has 
acquired source significance. 
Some scholars argue that despite its flaws, Abercrombie should be retained 
as it stands because it serves as a good proxy for consumer perception in many 
cases,284 and because the costs of changing the spectrum are too high.285 It is 
true that requiring evidence of secondary meaning in more cases would not be 
costless. Mark owners hoping to establish secondary meaning must gather 
evidence of sales, advertising budgets, and the length of the mark’s relatively 
exclusive use in the marketplace.286 Courts also expect consumer surveys to 
establish source significance and those surveys can be expensive to generate.287 
While these costs are not insignificant, requiring evidence of secondary 
meaning before protecting a suggestive mark may not cost as much as some 
critics fear. Many litigants already present consumer surveys into evidence 
because without such evidence, some courts express skepticism of the litigant’s 
claim.288 And requiring courts and examiners to distinguish between suggestive 
and descriptive marks, as they must under the current regime, is also costly due 
to the difficulty of drawing the suggestive–descriptive line.289 In fact, some 
courts faced with classifying a mark along the suggestive–descriptive line 
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 289 See supra Part II. 
2015] FALSE DICHOTOMY 1419 
prudentially assume the mark is descriptive and then analyze evidence of source 
significance, perhaps to reduce the likelihood that the decision will be 
reversed.290 
While there is reason to doubt the inherent distinctiveness of a suggestive 
mark, it is nevertheless possible that courts would resist even a modest change 
to the status quo vis-a-vis suggestive marks.291 The law has treated suggestive 
marks as inherently distinctive for so long that the contours of a direct inquiry 
into whether a suggestive mark has acquired source significance might continue 
to follow that predisposition. We might see the same resistance to change even 
if Congress embraced one of the statutory revisions outlined above. The 
phenomenon has been observed in other areas of intellectual property law. For 
example, Clarisa Long has documented a tendency by federal courts to resist 
application of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and refuse to find an 
infringement of the anti-dilution right.292 Likewise, courts considering a 
forfeiture of federal copyright protection under the 1909 Copyright Act 
preferred to find that potentially divestive publication of a copyrighted work 
was actually a disclosure to a limited group that did not foreclose subsequent 
copyright protection.293 
I make one other brief observation, which cannot be fully developed here. 
If the status quo holds, and trademark law continues to treat suggestive marks 
as inherently distinctive, the evidence on semantic shift should encourage mark 
owners to pursue suggestive marks over descriptive marks. Lawyers frequently 
council clients to select fanciful or arbitrary marks because if the mark is 
contested during litigation, a costly inquiry into source significance can 
sometimes be avoided.294 Marketing experts often counsel clients to do exactly 
the opposite and select a mark as close to the generic line as possible because 
those marks are seen as easier to fill with trademark meaning.295 Marketing 
experts argue that a descriptive mark will help consumers make a connection 
between product and source, and thus provide the mark owner with a leg up in 
its communicative efforts. The literature on semantic shift indicates that the 
metaphoric connection between a suggestive mark and the product sold can have 
similar benefits. Producers might therefore benefit from selecting a suggestive 
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mark that will more effectively connect the mark to the product sold than an 
arbitrary mark, but in which it can secure protection more readily than in a 
descriptive mark.296 
For those worried about language depletion as the primary reason to cabin 
protection for descriptive trademarks, a preference by producers for suggestive 
over descriptive marks would also be welcome. While we lack evidence about 
the ultimate number of potential suggestive marks that any mark owner could 
adopt, it is likely more than the number of relevant descriptive marks.297 Thus, 
encouraging mark owners to favor suggestive over descriptive marks might 
reduce the threat of language depletion and the competitive harms that could 
spring from protecting descriptive marks. 
While I acknowledge the difficulty of implementing the proposals outlined 
above, the semantic shift research calls into question the current protection of a 
suggestive mark on its first use in commerce. Trademark law is justifiable to the 
extent that it organizes the hierarchy of protection according to the processing 
costs of building source significance in a given word chosen as a mark. But 
trademark law draws too sharp a distinction between suggestive and descriptive 
marks, ignores the processing advantage that a suggestive mark may provide, 
and overestimates the ability of the suggestive mark to clearly signal source 
significance from its first use in commerce.298 It may be possible to preserve 
some differences between suggestive and descriptive marks, and treat 
suggestive marks as a truly unique category. But if suggestive marks must be 
categorized either with arbitrary and fanciful marks or with descriptive marks, 
they should be classified with descriptive marks and denied protection until 
there is evidence of source significance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Trademark law awards protection based in large part on the inherent or 
conceptual strength of the mark. Courts use the Abercrombie spectrum as the 
main rubric for determining the conceptual strength of a given word mark. 
Investing a trademark with source-signifying meaning is a type of semantic 
shift, and research into semantic shift can thus clarify trademark law’s virtues 
and limitations by providing a toolkit for reevaluating trademark law’s 
presumptions about consumer perception. 
While the Abercrombie spectrum has recently come under attack, semantic 
research justifies a limited defense for the spectrum. The types of language 
change recognized in the semantic shift literature, and the effects of different 
types of ambiguous words on language processing, indicate there are 
measurable differences in how consumers perceive words with multiple 
meanings. So long as the Abercrombie spectrum aligns with those findings, 
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applying the spectrum will help trademark law meet its stated goal of reducing 
consumer search costs by ensuring trademarks can communicate accurate 
information about the source of the product, and therefore its quality, to 
consumers. This analysis not only sheds new light on the continued viability of 
the Abercrombie spectrum, but also highlights a key target for legal reform. 
Semantic shift literature calls the current suggestive–distinctive line into 
question. 
The creation of a suggestive mark is a metaphoric semantic shift, which 
trades on audience predisposition towards cognitive efficiency. The current 
contours of the Abercrombie spectrum fail to recognize the power of that 
connection. Trademark doctrine mistakenly lumps suggestive and arbitrary 
marks together as inherently distinctive. The semantic shift literature provides 
evidence that arbitrary marks likely stand out as source-signifying from their 
first use in commerce. But the same is not true for suggestive marks. Suggestive 
and descriptive marks are not identical, but their similarities outweigh their 
differences, and those differences do not justify treating suggestive terms as 
inherently distinctive. If trademark law aims to distinguish between marks that 
automatically signal source and those that do not, and to require some evidence 
of source significance before protecting a mark with a strong connection to the 
product offered, then the inherent distinctiveness line should be redrawn. 

